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Freedom of speech is indivisible; unJess we protect it for a!J, we will have it 
for none. 
-Harry Kalven, Jr. 
If there be minority groups wbo hail this holding [rejecting a First Amendment 
challenge to a group libel statute] as their victory, they might consider the 
possible relevancy of this ancient remark: "Another such victory and I am 
undone." 
-Hugo Black, Jr. 
The civil rights movement would have been vastly different without the shield 
and spear of the First Amendment. The Bill of Rights . . . is of particular 
importance to those who have been the victims of oppression. 
- Benjamin L. Hooks 
It is technically impossible to write an anti-speech code that cannot be twisted 
against speech nobody means to bar. It has been tried and tried and tried. 
-Eleanor Holmes Norton 
The basic problem with all these regimes to protect various people is that the 
protection incapacitates .... To think that I [as a black man) will ... be told 
that white folks have the moraJ character to shrug off insults, and I do not . . .. 
That is the most insidious, the most insulting, the most racist statement of all ! 
-Alan Keyes 
Whom will we trust to censor communications and decide which ones are "too 
offensive" or "too inflammatory" or too devoid of intellectual content? . .. As a 
former president of the University of California once said: "The University is 
not engaged in making ideas safe for students. It is engaged in making students 
safe for ideas." 
-Derek Bok 
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[R]estrictive codes . . . may be expedient, even grounded in conviction, but the 
university cannot submit the two cherished ideals of freedom and equality to the 
legal system and expect both to be returned intact. 
-Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 
In the political climate that surrounds [racial] issues on campus, principle often 
yields to expediency and clarity turns into ambigujty, and this is no less true for 
some of our finest scholars. 
- Joseph Grano 
When language wounds, the natural and immediate impulse is to take steps to 
shut up those who utter the woundjng words. When, as here, that impulse is 
likely to be felt by those who are normally the first amendment's staunchest 
defenders, free expression faces its greatest threat. At such times, it is important 
for those committed to principles of free expression to remind each other of 
what they have always known regarding the long term costs of short term 
victories bought through compromising first amendment principles. 
-Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts 
As a former student activist, and as a current black militant, [I] believe[ ] that 
free speech is the minority's strongest weapon .. .. [P]aternalism [and] censor-
ship offer the college student a tranquilizer as the antidote to campus and 
societal racism. What we need is an alarm clock .... What we need is free speech 
... and more free speech. 
-Michael Meyers 
Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, Richard Delgado, and other "critical 
race theorists" recently have made provocative contributions to the 
perennial debate concerning the extent to which courts and civil libertar-
ians 1 should continue to construe the Constitution as protecting some 
forms of racist expression. This recurring issue has resurfaced most 
recently in connection with the distressing increase of racial incidents at 
colleges and universities around the country. In response, many of these 
institutions have adopted, or are considering, regulations that curb "hate 
speech" -that is, speech that expresses hatred or bias toward members 
of racial, religious, or other groups. 
Several recent judicial rulings, issued since the initial publication of 
the writings by Lawrence and his colleagues advocating hate speech 
regulations, have cast grave doubt on the constitutionality of any such 
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regulations. In the only three legal challenges to campus hate speech 
codes that have led to judicial rulings all three courts held that the codes 
violated the First Amendrnent.2 Moreover, although the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not ruled on campus hate-speech codes, in 1992 the Court 
unanimously struck down a city's hate speech law, invoking rationales 
that appear to doom campus speech codes too. 3 In these rulings, the 
courts concluded that restrictions on hate speech inevitably violate the 
cardinal free speech principle that speech may not be punished on the 
basis of its content or viewpoint, and also are inescapably vague and 
overbroad, thus punishing and chilling much expression that is constitu-
tionally protected. 
Notwithstanding the courts' continuing view that hate speech must 
be protected, in accordance with time-honored free speech principles, it 
is nevertheless important to respond to the calls that Lawrence and 
others have made for a reexamination of those principles. It is also 
important to respond to the intriguing new arguments that they have 
made for limiting hate speech, at least in the campus context. In particu-
lar, they forcefully urge that the Constitution's equality guarantee com-
pels the restriction of hate speech, because such speech fosters discrimi-
nation and undermines equality. 
Because civil libertarians are fully committed to securing constitu-
tional values of equality, as well as those of free speech, it is especially 
imperative for us thoughtfully to consider, and respond to, the argu-
ments made by Lawrence and other contemporary advocates of re-
stricting hate speech. This article constitutes such a consideration and 
response. Although it uses Lawrence's writings as a focal point, it also 
addresses the issues that have been raised by the many other recent 
proposals to regulate hate speech, including those advanced by Delgado 
and Matsuda. 
Civil libertarians are committed to the eradication of racial discrimi-
nation and the promotion of free speech throughout society. We have 
worked especially hard to combat both discrimination and free speech 
restrictions in educational institutions, which should be bastions of equal 
opportunity and unrestricted exchange. Therefore, we find the upsurge 
of both campus racism and regulation of campus speech particularly 
disturbing, and we have undertaken efforts to counter both. 
Because civil libertarians have learned that free speech is an indispens-
able instrument for the promotion of other rights and freedoms-includ-
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ing racial equality-we fear that the movement to regulate campus 
expression will undermine equality as well as free speech. Combating 
racial discrimination and protecting free speech should be viewed as 
mutually reinforcing rather than antagonistic goals. A diminution in 
society's commitment to racial equality is neither a necessary nor an 
appropriate price for protecting free speech. Those who frame the debate 
in terms of this false dichotomy simply drive artificial wedges between 
would-be allies in what should be a common effort to promote civil 
rights and civil liberties. 
Lawrence urges civil libertarians to "abandon[ ] ... overstated rhe-
torical and legal attacks on individuals who conscientiously seek to 
frame a public response to racism while preserving our first amendment 
liberties." 4 I join in this invitation, and I extend a corresponding one: 
Those individuals who espouse "new perspectives" on the First Amend-
ment in an effort to justify hate speech regulations should avoid over-
stated attacks on those who conscientiously seek to preserve our First 
Amendment liberties while responding to racism. 
In important respects, Lawrence inaccurately describes and unfairly 
criticizes both traditional civil libertarians in general and the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in particular. His argument depends on a 
"straw civil libertarian" who can be easily knocked down, but who does 
not correspond to the flesh and blood reality.5 For example, contrary to 
Lawrence's assumption, traditional civil libertarians do not categorically 
reject every effort to regulate racist speech. The ACLU has never argued 
that harassing, intimidating, or assaultive conduct should be immunized 
simply because it is in part based on words. Accordingly, traditional civil 
libertarians would agree with Lawrence that some examples of racially 
harassing speech should be subject to regulation consistent with First 
Amendment principles-for example, the often-cited incident of a group 
of white male students pursuing a black female student across campus 
shouting, "I've never tried a nigger." 
Of course, traditional civil libertarians have urged that any restric-
tions on expressive activity must be drawn narrowly, and carefully 
applied, to avoid chilling protected speech. But, to a substantial extent, 
Lawrence appears to endorse a similarly cautious approach. He stresses 
that he supports only limited regulations and invokes as a model the 
relatively limited code that Stanford University adopted in 1990.6 
Insofar as Lawrence advocates relatively narrow rules that apply 
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traditionally accepted limitations on expressive conduct to the campus 
setting, his position should not be alarming (although it is certainly 
debatable). In portions of his article, Lawrence seems to agree with 
traditional civil libertarians that only a small subset of the racist rhetoric 
that abounds in our society should be regulated. Although we may 
disagree about the contours of such concepts as "captive audience," 
"fighting words," or "intentional infliction of emotional distress," these 
differences should not obscure strong common goals. Surely our twin 
aims of civil rights and civil liberties would be advanced more effectively 
by fighting together against the common enemy of racism than by fight-
ing against each other over which narrow subset of one symptom of 
racism-namely, verbal and symbolic expressions-should be regu-
lated. 
What is most disquieting about Lawrence's article is not the relatively 
limited Stanford code he defends, but rather his simultaneous defense of 
additional, substantially more sweeping speech prohibitions. The ratio-
nales that Lawrence advances for the regulations that he endorses are so 
open-ended that, if accepted, they would appear to warrant the prohibi-
tion of all racist speech, and thereby would cut to the core of our system 
of free expression. 
Although Lawrence's specific proposed code appears relatively mod-
est, his supporting rationales depend on nothing less immodest than the 
abrogation of the traditional distinctions between speech and conduct 
and between state action and private action. He equates private racist 
speech with governmental racist conduct. 7 This approach offers no prin-
cipled way to confine racist speech regulations to the particular contours 
of the Stanford code, or indeed to any particular contours at all. Law-
rence apparently acknowledges that, if accepted, his theories could war-
rant the prohibition of all private racist speech.8 Moreover, although he 
stresses the particular evils of racism, he also says that "much of my 
analysis applies to violent pornography and homophobic hate speech." 9 
Thus, Lawrence himself demonstrates that any specific, seemingly mod-
est proposal to regulate speech may in fact represent the proverbial "thin 
edge of the wedge" for initiating broader regulations. 
As just explained, the relatively narrow Stanford code that Lawrence 
endorses is incongruous with his broad theoretical rationale. The Stan-
ford code also is at odds with Lawrence's pragmatic rationale. The 
harms of racist speech that he seeks to redress largely remain untouched 
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by the rule. For example, Lawrence movingly recounts the pain suffered 
by his sister's family as a result of racist expression, as well as the anxiety 
he endured as a boy even from the possibility of racist expression. Yet 
the Stanford code clearly would not apply to any of the unspoken racist 
expressions that may well lurk beneath the surface of much parlance in 
American life. Moreover, the regulation also would not apply unless the 
speech was directly targeted at a specific victim. Therefore, it would not 
have relieved Lawrence or his family of the traumas they experienced. 
Furthermore, the Stanford code would not address the racist incident at 
Stanford that led to its adoption. 10 Likewise, many additional campus 
racist incidents catalogued by Lawrence and others would be beyond the 
scope of the Stanford code. 
Two problems arise from the disharmony between the breadth of the 
racist speech regulations endorsed by Lawrence and the harm that in-
spires them. First, this disparity underscores the rules' ineffectiveness. 
The regulations do not even address much of the racist speech, let alone 
the innumerable other manifestations of racism which-as Lawrence 
himself stresses-pervade our society. Second, this disharmony encour-
ages the proponents of hate speech regulations to seek to narrow the gap 
between the underlying problem and their favored solution by recom-
mending broader regulations. For example, Mari Matsuda has proposed 
a substantially more restrictive hate speech regulation, and Lawrence 
has indicated his approval of Matsuda's approach. So the wedge widens. 
In this chapter I attempt to bridge some of the gaps that Lawrence 
believes separate advocates of equality from advocates of free speech. I 
show that, insofar as proponents of hate speech regulations endorse 
relatively narrow rules that encompass only a limited category of racist 
expression, these gaps are not so significant in practical effect. I also 
demonstrate that the First and Fourteenth Amendments are allies rather 
than antagonists. Most importantly, in this chapter I maintain that 
equality will be served most effectively by continuing to apply tradi-
tional, speech-protective precepts to racist speech, because a robust free-
dom of speech ultimately is necessary to combat racial discrimination. 
Lawrence points out that free speech values as well as equality values 
may be promoted by regulating certain verbal harassment and retarded 
by not regulating it. But we must also recognize that equality values may 
be promoted most effectively by not regulating certain hate speech and 
retarded by regulating it. 
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Part I of this chapter demonstrates that traditional civiJ libertarians 
agree with Lawrence's point that some speech amounts to verbal assault 
or harassment and may be subject to government regulation. Part 2 
shows that Lawrence's conception of regulable racist speech is broader 
than that permitted by established constitutional doctrine and would 
endanger fundamental free speech vaJues. Part 3 explores the even 
greater danger to free speech values posed by Lawrence's expansive 
rationales. Of primary importance, part 3 exposes the flaws in Law-
rence's major argument-that Brown v. Board of Education and other 
decisions that invalidate governmental racist conduct somehow legiti-
mize regulation of nongovernmental racist speech. 
Notwithstanding my differences with Lawrence about the boundaries 
of regulable racist expression, it is important to place these differences 
in proper perspective. Even the racist speech that he would regulate 
constitutes onJy a small fraction of all racist speech. Thus, most racist 
expression would remain untouched under both Lawrence's approach 
and the approach traditionally endorsed by civil libertarians and the 
Supreme Court. More importantly, as is discussed in part 4, Lawrence's 
proposal would not effectively address the underlying problem of racism 
itself, of which racist speech is a symptom. Part 4 shows that suppressing 
racist speech could even aggravate racially discriminatory attitudes. 
Thus, the goals of free speech and of eradicating racism are not incom-
patible, as Lawrence sometimes suggests. Rather, as he also recognizes, 
these goals are mutually reinforcing. AJthough my discussion focuses on 
Lawrence's specific proposal, it applies as well to all other proposals to 
censor hate speech. 
Finally, part 5 maintains that we should channel our efforts toward 
devising means to combat racism that are consistent with the First 
Amendment. This strategy ultimately will be more effective than censor-
ship in promoting both equality and free speech. The resurgence of racist 
expression on American campuses has sparked a revitalized national 
dedication to promoting racial equality on college campuses and 
throughout our society and the forging of creative strategies for doing 
so. In order to counter racist speech, Lawrence urges us to "think 
creatively as lawyers." 11 But if we are to understand and eradicate the 
complex root causes oi racial discrimination, tnen we must think cre-
atively as more than just lawyers.12 We must draw upon the insights and 
skills of educators, sociologists, and psychologists. To draft legaJ rules 
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that address only one manifestation of these deeper problems of racial 
inequality is at best ineffective, and at worst counterproductive. 
1. SOME LIMITED FORMS OF CAMPUS HA TE SPEECH 
MAY BE REGULABLE UNDER CURRENT 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
A. General Constitutional Principles Applicable to Regulating 
Campus Hate Speech 
To put in proper perspective the points of disagreement between Law-
rence's analysis and traditional civil-libertarian views, the points of 
agreement first should be noted. Lawrence usefully rehearses the many 
shared understandings between advocates of traditional First Amend-
ment doctrine, which protects much racist speech, and advocates of 
various hate speech regulations. Lawrence acknowledges that there are 
strong reasons for sheltering even racist speech, in terms of reinforcing 
society's commitment to tolerance and mobilizing its opposition to intol-
erance. Consequently, he recognizes that to frame the debate in terms of 
a conflict between freedom of speech and the elimination of racism poses 
a false dichotomy. Accordingly, he urges civil libertarians to examine 
not just the substance of our position on racist speech, but also the way 
in which we enter the debate, to ensure that we condemn racist ideas at 
the same time as we defend the right to utter them. 
There may be even more common ground between Lawrence and the 
traditional civil libertarian position than he expressly acknowledges. In 
presenting the civil libertarian position as absolute and uni-focused, he 
oversimplifies and thereby distorts it. For example, as previously noted, 
Lawrence sets up a "straw civil libertarian" who purportedly would 
afford absolute protection to all racist speech-or at least "all racist 
speech that stops short of physical violence." 13 In fact, as evidenced by 
ACLU policies, traditional civil libertarians do not take such an extreme 
position. Moreover, as a matter of both policy and practice, the ACLU 
already condemns the ideas expressed by racist and other anti-civil 
libertarian speakers at the same time that it defends their right to utter 
them. Thus, contrary to Lawrence's implication, such condemnation 
would not constitute an innovation. 
Lawrence also mischaracterizes traditional civil libertarians when he 
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asserts that we tolerate the regulation of "garden variety" fighting 
words, but not racist fighting words. Some civil libertarians might agree 
with the Supreme Court's formerly stated view that a narrowly defined 
category of "fighting words" might not be constitutionally protected.14 
Other civil libertarians maintain, consistent with the Court's apparent 
repudiation of its earlier view, that "fighting words" should not be 
excluded from First Amendment protection.15 All agree, however, that 
racist fighting words should receive the same degree of protection (or 
nonprotection) as other fighting words. 
Consistent with Lawrence's free speech concerns, the category of 
racist speech he seeks to regulate under the Stanford code is relatively 
narrow compared to other campus hate speech rules.16 In important 
respects, this proposal overlaps with the traditional civil libertarian po-
sition. 
On the end of the spectrum where speech is constitutionally pro-
tected, Lawrence agrees with courts and traditional civil libertarians 
that the First Amendment should protect racist speech in a Skokie-type 
context.17 The essentials of a Skokie-type setting are that the offensive 
speech occurs in a public place and the event is announced in advance. 
Hence, the offensive speech can be either avoided or countered by op-
posing speech. Traditional civil libertarians recognize that this speech 
causes psychic pain. We nonetheless agree with the decision of the U.S. 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Skokie that this pain is a necessary 
price for a system of free expression, which ultimately redounds to the 
benefit of racial and other minorities. 18 Lawrence apparently shares 
this view. 
On the other end of the spectrum, where expression may be prohib-
ited, traditional civil libertarians agree with Lawrence that the First 
Amendment should not necessarily protect targeted individual harass-
ment just because it happens to use the vehicle of speech. The ACLU 
maintains this nonabsolutist position with regard to both racist harass-
ment on campus and sexual harassment in the workplace. For example, 
the ACLU's "Policy Statement on Free Speech and Bias on College 
Campuses," which its National Board of Directors adopted without 
dissent in 1990 (see Appendix for its full text), while opposing all 
regulations that "interfere with the freedom ... to teach, learn, discuss 
and debate or ... express ideas, opinions or feelings in classroom, public 
or private discourse," also recognizes that colleges and universities may 
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restrict "acts of harassment, intimidation and invasion of privacy," be-
cause "[t]he fact that words may be used in connection with otherwise 
actionable conduct does not immunize such conduct from appropriate 
regulation." 
As the ACLU policy on campus hate speech acknowledges, terms 
such as " 'harassment,' 'intimidation,' and 'invasion of privacy' are im-
precise" and hence "susceptible of impermissibly overbroad applica-
tion." Nevertheless, each term "defines a type of conduct which is legally 
proscribed in many jurisdictions when directed at a specific individual or 
individuals and when intended to frighten, coerce, or unreasonably harry 
or intrude upon its target." The policy cites as an example of expressive 
conduct that would be appropriately sanctionable "[t]hreatening tele-
phone calls to a minority student's dormitory room," but stresses that, 
in contrast, "[e]xpressive behavior which has no other effect than to 
create an unpleasant learning environment . . . would not be the proper 
subject of regulation." 
Because there is no clear boundary between expression that consti-
tutes proscribable harassment and expression that constitutes protected 
free speech, even civil libertarians who agree that this is the appropriate 
line to draw still would be expected to disagree about whether particular 
expressive conduct fell on one side of the boundary or the other. How-
ever, the essential underlying point still stands: traditional civil libertari-
ans share what Lawrence describes as a "moderate" perspective with 
regard to harassing speech on campus- that is, that such speech should 
be neither absolutely protected nor absolutely prohibited. 19 
In other situations involving racist speech, the ACLU also has recog-
nized that otherwise punishable conduct should not be shielded simply 
because it relies in part on words. Some examples were provided by 
ACLU president Norman Dorsen: "During the Skokie episode, the 
ACLU refused to defend a Nazi who was prosecuted for offering a cash 
bounty for killing a Jew. The reward linked the speech to action in an 
impermissible way. Nor would we defend a Nazi (or anyone else) whose 
speech interfered with a Jewish religious service, or who said, 'There's a 
Jew; let's get him.' " 20 
The foregoing ACLU positions are informed by established principles 
that govern the protectability of speech. Under these principles, speech 
may be regulated if it is an essential element of violent or unlawful 
conduct, if it is likely to cause an immediate injury by its very utterance, 
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and if it is addressed to a "captive audience" unable to avoid assaultive 
messages. It should be stressed that each of these criteria is ambiguous 
and may be difficult to apply in particular situations. Accordingly, the 
ACLU insists that these exceptions to free speech must be strictly con-
strued and would probably find them to be satisfied only in rare factual 
circumstances. Nevertheless, ACLU policies expressly recognize that if 
certain speech fits within these narrow parameters, then it could be regu-
lable. 21 
The captive audience concept in particular is an elusive and challeng-
ing one to apply. As Laurence Tribe has cautioned, this concept "is 
dangerously encompassing, and the Court has properly been reluctant to 
accept its implications whenever a regulation is not content-neutral." 22 
Noting that we are "often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home 
and subject to objectionable speech," 23 the Court has ruled that, in 
public places, we bear the burden of averting our attention from expres-
sion we find offensive.24 Otherwise, the Court explained, "a ~ajority 
[could] silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections." 25 
The Court has been less reluctant to apply the captive audience concept 
to private homes.26 However, the Court has held that even in the home, 
free speech values may outweigh privacy concerns, requiring individuals 
to receive certain unwanted communications.27 
The Court's application of the captive audience doctrine illustrates 
the general notion that an important factor in determining the protection 
granted to speech is the place where it occurs. At one extreme, certain 
public places-such as public parks-have been deemed "public fo-
rums," where freedom of expression should be especially protected. At 
the other extreme, some private domains-such as residential build-
ings-have been deemed places where freedom of expression should 
be subject to restriction in order to guard the occupants' privacy and 
tranquility. In between these two poles, certain public areas might be 
held not to be public forums because the people who occupy them might 
be viewed as "captive." Thus, the question whether any particular racist 
speech should be subject to regulation is a fact-specific inquiry. We 
cannot define particular words as inherently off limits, but rather we 
must examine every word in the overall context in which it is uttered. 
The foregoing principles that govern the permissibility of speech regu-
lations in general should guide our analysis of the permissibility of 
particular speech regulations in the academic setting. The Supreme 
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Court has declared that within the academic environment freedom of 
expression should receive heightened protection 28 and that a "university 
campus ... possesses many of the characteristics of a traditional public 
forum." 29 These considerations would suggest that hate speech should 
receive special protection within the university community. Conversely, 
Mari Matsuda argues that equality guarantees and other principles that 
might weigh in favor of prohibiting racist speech also are particularly 
important in the academic context. 
The appropriate analysis is more complex than either set of general-
izations assumes. In weighing the constitutional concerns of free speech, 
equality, and privacy that hate speech regulations implicate, decision 
makers must take into account the particular context within the univer-
sity in which the speech occurs. For example, the Court's generalizations 
about the heightened protection due free speech in the academic world 
certainly are applicable to some campus areas, such as parks, malls, or 
other traditional gathering places. The generalizations, however, may 
not be applicable to other areas, such as students' dormitory rooms. 
These rooms constitute the students' homes. Accordingly, under estab-
lished free speech and privacy tenets, students should have some rights 
to avoid being exposed to others' expression by seeking refuge in their 
rooms. 
Some areas on campus present difficult problems concerning the ap-
propriate level of speech protection because they share characteristics of 
both private homes and public forums. For example, one could argue 
that hallways, common rooms, and other common areas in dormitory 
buildings constitute extensions of the individual students' rooms. On the 
other hand, one could argue that these common areas constitute tradi-
tional gathering places and should be regarded as public forums, open 
to expressive activities at least by all dormitory residents if not by the 
broader community. The latter argument would derive general support 
from the Supreme Court decisions that uphold the free speech rights of 
demonstrators in residential neighborhoods on the theory that individual 
residents' rights of stopping "the flow of information into [their] house-
hold[s]" does not allow them to impede the flow of this same informa-
tion to their neighbors.30 The Supreme Court, however, recently de-
clined to resolve the specific issue of whether university dormitories 
constitute public forums for free speech purposes.31 
Even in the areas of the university reserved for academic activities, 
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such as classrooms, the calculus to determine the level of speech protec-
tion is complex. On the one hand, the classroom is the quintessential 
"marketplace of ideas," 32 which should be open to the vigorous and 
robust exchange even of insulting or offensive words, on the theory that 
sucb an exchange ultimately will benefit not only the academic commu-
nity but also the larger community in its pursuit of knowledge and 
understanding. 33 
On the other hand, advocates of campus hate speech codes contend 
that in the long run, the aca?emic dialogue might be stultified rather 
than stimulated by the inclusion of racist speech. They maintain that 
such speech not only interferes with equal educational opportunities, but 
also deters the exercise of other freedoms, including those secured by the 
First Amendment. Lawrence argues that, as a consequence of hate 
speech, minority students are deprived of the opportunity to participate 
in the academic interchange, and that the exchange is impoverished by 
their exclusion. It must be emphasized, though, that expression subject 
to regulation on this rationale would have to be narrowly defined in 
order to protect the free flow of ideas that is vital to the academic 
community; thus, much expression would remain unregulated-expres-
sion that could be sufficiently upsetting to interfere with students' educa-
tional opportunities. 34 
Another factor that might weigh in favor of imposing some regula-
tions on speech in class is that students arguably constitute a captive 
audience. This characterization is especially apt when the course is re-
quired and class attendance is mandatory. Likewise, the case for regula-
tion becomes more compelling the more power the racist speaker wields 
over the audience.35 For example, the law should afford students special 
protection from racist insults directed at them by their professors. 
Even if various areas of a university are not classified as public 
forums, and even if occupants of such areas are designated captive 
audiences, any speech regulations in these areas still would be invalid if 
they discriminated on the basis of a speaker's viewpoint. Viewpoint-
based discrimination constitutes the most egregious form of censorship36 
and almost always violates the First Amendment. Accordingly, view-
point discrimination is proscribed even in regulations that govern non-
public forum government property and regulations that protect captive 
audiences. 37 
Because most hate speech regulations are viewpoint discriminatory, 
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targeting only expression that conveys derogatory ideas, they could not 
be justified even to protect captive audiences. The Stanford policy, for 
example, proscribes only expression that " is intended to insult or stig-
matize" on the basis of race and other prohibited categories. The varia-
tion on the Stanford code that Lawrence endorsed would have com-
pounded this viewpoint discrimination by expressly excluding insulting 
speech directed at "dominant majority groups. " 38 Moreover, although 
the code that Stanford adopted does not expressly reflect this particu-
larly egregious form of viewpoint discrimination, the chair of the com-
mittee that propounded the rule indjcated that it would be enforced as if 
it did incorporate an exception for speech that is insulting to "dominant 
majority groups." 39 
8 . Particular Speech Limiting Doctrines Potentially Applicable 
to Campus Hate Speech 
In addition to the foregoing general principles, Lawrence and other 
proponents of campus hate speech regulations invoke three specific doc-
trines in an attempt to justify such rules: the fighting words doctrine; the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress; and the tort of group 
defamation.40 As the following discussion shows, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that each of these doctrines may well be inconsistent with 
free speech principles. Therefore these doctrines may not support any 
campus hate speech restrictions whatsoever. In any event, they at most 
would support only restrictions that are both narrowly drawn and nar-
rowly applied. 
I. Fighting Words. The fighting words doctrine is the principal model 
for the Stanford code, which Lawrence supports. However, this doctrine 
pro~ides a constitutionally shaky foundation for many reasons: it has 
been substantially limited in scope and is probably no longer good law; 
even if the Supreme Court were to apply a narrowed version of the 
doctrine, such application would threaten free speech principles; and, as 
actually implemented, the fighting words doctrine suppresses protectible 
speech and entails the inherent danger of discriminatory application to 
speech by members of minority groups and dissidents. 
In addition to the foregoing, independently sufficient bases for re-
jecting campus hate speech regulations modeled on the fighting words 
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doctrine, in I992 the Supreme Court dealt such regulations yet another 
devastating blow. In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 41 the Court unanimously 
invalidated a city ordinance that criminalized hate speech, and which the 
state supreme court had construed to apply ·,only to fighting words. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court expressly declined to consider the 
ongoing validity of the fighting words exception to the First Amend-
ment, it ruled that even if some such speech could constitutionally be 
restricted, it could never be restricted on the basis of its content or 
subject matter, or on the basis of its viewpoint. Because campus hate 
speech regulations, like the city ordinance at issue in R.A. V., focus only 
on fighting words that address certain subjects-namely, race, religion, 
gender, and other prohibited bases of discrimination-they are content 
based. Moreover, because they condemn only derogatory statements 
about those subjects, they suffer the additional constitutional defect of 
being viewpoint based. Accordingly, the Court's explanation for striking 
down the St. Paul hate speech law would apply fully to campus hate 
speech regulations as well : 
[T]he ordinance applies only to "fighting words" that insult, or provoke vio-
lence, "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." [Expressions] 
containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible 
unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics. Those who 
wish to use "fighting words" in connection with other ideas-to express hostil-
ity, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or 
homosexuality-are not covered. The First Amendment does not permit St. 
Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on 
disfavored subjects .... 
In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond mere 
content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination. [Expressions] con-
taining some words- odious racial epithets, for example-would be prohibited 
to proponents of all views. But "fighting words" that do not themselves invoke 
race, color, creed, religion, or gender-aspersions upon a person's mother, for 
example-would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing 
in favor of racial, color, etc. tolerance and equality, but could not be used by 
that speaker's opponents ... . St. Paul has no such authority to license one side 
of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of 
Queensbury Rules.42 
While the Court in R.A. V. did not reach the issue of the ongoing 
constitutional validity of any fighting words exception to the First 
Amendment, analysis reveals that the fighting words concept that the 
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Court initially formulated in 1942. has since been substantially limited, 
essentially to the point of nonexistence, because the initial formulation 
contravenes fundamental free speech principles. 
Although the Court originally defined constitutionally regulable 
fighting words in fairly broad terms in its 1942. ruling in Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 43 subsequent decisions have narrowed the definition 
to such a point that the doctrine probably would not apply to any of the 
instances of campus racist speech that Lawrence and others seek to 
regulate. As originally formulated in Chaplinsky, the fighting words 
doctrine excluded from First Amendment protection "insulting or ' fight-
ing' words, those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of peace." 
In light of subsequent developments, it is significant to note that the 
first prong of Chaplinsky's fighting words definition, words "which by 
their very utterance inflict injury," was dictum. The Court's actual hold-
ing was that the state statute at issue was justified by the state's interest 
in preserving the public peace by prohibiting "words likely to cause an 
average addressee to fight." The Court stressed that "no words were 
forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence 
by the person to whom, individually, [they are] addressed." The Court 
also held that the statute had been applied appropriately to Mr. Chaplin-
sky, who had called a city marshal "a God damned racketeer" and "a 
damned Fascist." It explained that these "epithets [are] likely to provoke 
the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the 
peace." 
In 1972., in Gooding v. Wilson,44 the Court substantially narrowed 
Chaplinsky's definition of fighting words by bringing that definition into 
line with Chaplinsky's actual holding. In Gooding, as well as in every 
subsequent fighting words case, the Court disregarded the dictum in 
which the first prong of Chaplinsky's definition was set forth and treated 
only those words that "tend to incite an immediate breach of peace" as 
fighting words. Consistent with this narrowed definition, the Court has 
invalidated regulations that hold certain words to be per se proscribable 
and has insisted that each chaJlenged utterance be evaluated contextu-
ally. 45 Thus, under the Court's current view, even facially valid laws that 
restrict fighting words may be applied constitutionally only in circum-
stances where their utterance almost certainly wi!J lead to immediate 
violence.46 Laurence Tribe described this doctrinal development as, in 
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effect, incorporating the so-called clear and present danger test into the 
fighting words doctrine; in other words, speech may be limited only if 
necessary to avert an imminent, tangible harm. 
In accordance with its narrow construction of constitutionally permis-
sible prohibitions upon " fighting words," the Court has overturned 
every single fighting words conviction that it has reviewed since Chaplin-
sky. Moreover, in one post-Chaplinsky decision, the Court overturned 
an injunction that had been based on the very word that had led to the 
conviction in Chaplinsky itself (fascist).47 
For the foregoing reasons, Supreme Court justices and constitutional 
scholars persuasively maintain that Chaplinsky's fighting words doctrine 
is no longer good law.48 Even more fundamentally, constitutional schol-
ars have convincingly argued that this doctrine should no longer be good 
law, for reasons that are particularly weighty in the context of racist 
slurs. First, as Stephen Gard concluded in a comprehensive review of 
both Supreme Court and lower court decisions that apply the fighting 
words doctrine, the asserted governmental interest in preventing a 
breach of the peace is not logically furthered by this doctrine. He ex-
plained: 
[l]t is fallacious to believe that personally abusive epithets, even if addressed 
face-to-face to the object of the speaker's criticism, are likely to arouse the 
ordinary law abiding person beyond mere anger to uncontrollable reflexive 
violence. Further, even if one unrealistically assumes that reflexive violence will 
result, it is unlikely that the fighting words doctrine can successfully deter such 
lawless conduct.49 
Second, just as the alleged peace-preserving purpose does not ratio-
nalJy justify the fighting words doctrine in general, that rationale also 
fails to justify the fighting words doctrine when applied to racial slurs in 
particular. As Harry Kalven noted, "outbursts of violence are not the 
necessary consequence of such speech and, more important, such vio-
lence when it does occur is not the serious evil of the speech." so Rather, 
as Lawrence stresses, the serious evil of racial slurs consists of the 
ugliness of the ideas they express and the psychic injury they cause to 
their addressees. Therefore, the fighting words doctrine does not address 
and will not prevent the injuries caused by campus racist speech. 
Even if there were a real danger that racist or other fighting words 
would cause reflexive violence, and even if that danger would be reduced 
by the threat of legal sanction, the fighting words doctrine still would be 
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problematic in terms of free speech principles. As Zechariah Chafee 
observed, this doctrine "makes a man a criminal simply because his 
neighbors have no self-control and cannot refrain from violence."51 In 
other contexts, the Court appropriately has refused to allow the address-
ees of speech to exercise such a "heckler's veto." 52 
The fighting words doctrine is constitutionally flawed for the addi-
tional reasons that it suppresses much protectible speech and that the 
protectible speech of minority group members is particularly vulnerable. 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's limitation of the doctrine's scope, 
Gard's survey reveals that the lower courts apply it much more broadly. 
Since the Supreme Court reviews only a fraction of such cases, the 
doctrine's actual impact on free speech must be assessed in terms of 
these speech-restrictive lower court rulings. Gard concluded that, in the 
lower courts, the fighting words doctrine "is almost uniformly invoked 
in a selective and discriminatory manner by law enforcement officials to 
punish trivial violations of a constitutionally impermissible interest in 
preventing criticism of official conduct." 53 Indeed, Gard reported, "it is 
virtually impossible to find fighting words cases that do not involve 
either the expression of opinion on issues of public policy or words 
directed toward a government official, usually a police officer." 54 Even 
more disturbing is that the reported cases indicate that blacks are often 
prosecuted and convicted for the use of fighting words, including in 
situations where they are advocating civil rights.55 Thus, the record of 
the actual implementation of the fighting words doctrine demonstrates 
that-as is the case with all speech restrictions-it endangers principles 
of equality as well as free speech. That record substantiates the risk that 
such a speech restriction wiJI be applied discriminatorily against the very 
minority group members whom it is intended to protect. 
Lawrence himself notes that many Supreme Court decisions that 
overruled fighting words convictions involved a "potentially offended 
party [who] was in a position of relative power when compared with the 
speaker." 56 As Gard demonstrated, for each such conviction that was 
reviewed and overturned by the Supreme Court, many others were not.57 
Thus, Lawrence and other proponents of university speech codes that 
are based on the fighting words model must believe that university 
officials will enforce them in a manner that differs from the general 
enforcement pattern of similar regulations. They must have faith that 
university officials, as opposed to other officials, are unusually sensitive 
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to free speech rights in general, and to the free speech rights of minority 
group members and dissidents in particular. 
Based on his analysis of the actual application of the fighting words 
doctrine, Gard adheres to no such faith in the discretion of enforcing 
officials. In response to another legal academic's suggestion that the 
fighting words doctrine could be invoked to protect the aged and infirm 
from "the vilest personal verbal abuse," Gard said that this was "a 
romantic vision that exists only in the imagination of a law professor." 58 
Even assuming that university officials might be unusually attentive to 
free speech values when implementing the fighting words doctrine, the 
use of that doctrine by universities could fuel an increased use by other 
officials, who might well fail to implement it in a speech-sensitive 
fashion.59 
2. Intentional lnfl.iction of Emotional Distress. A committee report that 
was considered by the University of Texas recommended regulating 
campus hate speech in accordance with the common law tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. This doctrinal approach has a 
logical appeal because it focuses on the type of harm potentially caused 
by racist speech that universities are most concerned with alleviating-
namely, emotional or psychological harm that interferes with studies. In 
contrast, the harm at which the fighting words doctrine aims-potential 
violence by the addressee against the speaker-is of less concern to 
most universities. 
Traditional civil libertarians caution that the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress theory should almost never apply to verbal harass-
ment. A major problem is that, as Gard notes, "the innate vagueness of 
the interest in preventing emotional injury to listeners suggests that any 
attempt at judicial enforcement will inevitably result in the imposition of 
judges' subjective linguistic preferences on society, discrimination 
against ethnic and racial minorities, and ultimately the misuse of the 
rationale to justify the censorship of the ideological content of the 
speaker's message." 60 Again, as was true for the fighting words doctrine, 
there is a particular danger that the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress doctrine also will be enforced to the detriment of the very 
minority groups whom the hate speech code advocates hope to protect. 
The significant general problems with the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress theory counsel against its application in the campus 
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context specifically. Citing these reasons, Stanford University declined to 
base its hate speech regulation on this tort model. Moreover, even 
though the University of Texas committee report concluded that the 
emotional distress approach was less problematical than the fighting 
words approach, it cautioned: "[T]here can be no guarantee as to the 
constitutionality of any university rule bearing on racial harassment and 
sensitive matters of freedom of expression." 
The position that the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort 
should virtually never apply to words received substantial support in the 
Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. 61 Writ-
ing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist reversed a jury 
verdict that had awarded damages to the nationally known minister, 
Jerry Falwell, for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The 
Court held that a public figure such as Falwell may not "recover dam-
ages for emotional harm caused by the publication of an ad parody 
offensive to him, and doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of 
most." The Court further ruled that public figures and public officials 
may not recover for this tort unless they could show that the publication 
contained a false statement of fact that was made with "actual malice," 
that is, with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless 
disregard as to whether or not it was false. ln other words, the Court 
required public officials or public figures who claim intentional infliction 
of emotional distress to satisfy the same heavy burden of proof it im-
poses upon such individuals who bring defamation claims. 
Although the specific Falwell holding focused on public-figure plain-
tiffs, much of the Court's language indicated that, because of First 
Amendment concerns, it would strictly construe the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress tort in general, even when pursued by nonpublic 
plaintiffs. For example, the Court said, to require a statement to be 
"outrageous" as a prerequisite for imposing liability did not sufficiently 
protect First Amendment values. Because the "outrageousness" of the 
challenged statement is a typical element of the tort (it is included in 
the Restatement of Torts definition) the Court's indication that it is 
constitutionally suspect has ramifications beyond the sphere of public-
figure actions. The Court warned: 
"Outrageousnessn in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent 
subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liabiliry on the basis 
of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a 
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particular expression. An "outrageousness" standard thus runs afoul of our 
longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in 
question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.62 
For the reasons signaled by the unanimous Supreme Court in Falwell, 
any cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress that 
arises from words must be narrowly framed and strictly applied in order 
to satisfy First Amendment dictates. 
3. Group Defamation. Lawrence does not elaborate on either the consti-
tutionality or efficacy of the group defamation concept, yet he approv-
ingly notes others' alleged support for it. The group defamation concept, 
however, has been thoroughly discredited by judges and scholars.63 
First, group defamation regulations are unconstitutional in terms of 
both Supreme Court doctrine and free speech principles. To be sure, 
the Supreme Court's only decision that expressly reviewed the issue, 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 64 upheld a group libel statute against a First 
Amendment challenge. However, that 5-4 decision was issued more 
than forty years ago, in 1952, at a relatively early point in the Court's 
developing free speech jurisprudence. Beauharnais is widely assumed no 
longer to be good law in light of the Court's subsequent speech-protec-
tive decisions on related issues, notably its holdings that strictly limit 
individual defamation actions so as not to chill free speech. In particular, 
as Laurence Tribe has noted, the Court's landmark ruling in New York 
Times v. Sullivan65 "seemed ... to eclipse Beauharnais' sensitivity to 
... group defamation claims .. . because New York Times required 
public officials bringing libel suits to prove that a defamatory statement 
was directed at the official personally, and not simply at a unit of gov-
ernment." 
Statements that defame groups convey opinions or ideas on matters 
of public concern, and therefore should be protected even if those state-
ments also injure reputations or feelings. The Supreme Court recently 
reaffirmed this principle in a 1990 decision involving an individual 
defamation action, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 66 
In addition to flouting constitutional doctrine and free speech princi-
ples, rules sanctioning group defamation are ineffective in curbing the 
specific class of hate speech that Lawrence advocates restraining. Even 
Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the narrow Beauharnais majority re-
peatedly expressed doubt about the wisdom or efficacy of group libel 
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laws. Justice Frankfurter stressed that the Court upheld the Illinois law 
in question only because of judicial deference to the state legislature's 
judgments on these points. Ironically, though, the Illinois legislature 
apparently did not consider its group libel law to be particularly wise or 
effective, because it repealed that law in its first revision of the state 
criminal code following the Supreme Court's decision, only nine years 
after the decision. 
The concept of defamation encompasses only false statements of fact 
that are made without good-faith belief in their truth. Therefore, any 
disparaging or insulting statement would be immune from this doctrine, 
unless it were factual in nature, demonstrably false in content, and made 
in bad faith. Members of minority groups that are disparaged by an 
allegedly libelous statement would hardly have their reputations or psy-
ches enhanced by a process in which the maker of the statement sought 
to prove his good-faith belief in its truth, and they were required to 
demonstrate the absence thereof. 
One additional problem with group defamation statutes as a model 
for rules sanctioning campus hate speech should be noted. As with the 
other speech-restrictive doctrines asserted to justify such rules, group 
defamation laws introduce the risk that rules will be enforced at the 
expense of the very minority groups sought to be protected. The Illinois 
statute67 upheld in Beauharnais is illustrative. According to a leading 
article on group libel laws, during the 1940s the Illinois statute was "a 
weapon for harassment of the Jehovah's Witnesses," who were then "a 
minority ... very much more in need of protection than most." 68 
C. Even a Narrow Regulation Could Have a Negative Symbolic 
Impact on Constitutional Values 
Taking into account the constraints imposed by free speech principles 
and doctrines potentially applicable to the regulation of campus hate 
speech, it might be possible-although difficult-to frame a sufficiently 
narrow rule to withstand a facial First Amendment challenge. However, 
it bears reemphasizing that, as the University of Texas committee report 
stressed, "[T]here can be no guarantee as to the constitutionality of any 
university rule bearing on racial harassment and sensitive matters of 
freedom of expression." 
Even assuming that a regulation could be crafted with sufficient preci-
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sion to survive a facial constitutional challenge, several further problems 
would remain, which should give any university pause in evaluating 
whether to adopt such a rule. Although these inherent problems with 
any hate speech regulation are discussed in greater detail below, in the 
context of analyzing Lawrence's specific proposal, they are summarized 
here. First, because of the discretion entailed in enforcing any such 
rule, they all involve an inevitable danger of arbitrary or discriminatory 
enforcement.69 Therefore, the rule's implementation would have to be 
monitored to ensure that it did not exceed the bounds of the regulation's 
terms or threaten content-and viewpoint-neutrality principles.70 This 
danger is graphically illustrated by the experience with the only campus 
hate speech rules for which a fuU enforcement record is available (be-
cause they were subject to litigation, and hence, disclosure): those at the 
Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin. 
Second, there is an inescapable risk that any hate speech regulation, 
no matter how narrowly drawn, will chill speech beyond its literal scope. 
Members of the university community may well err on the side of 
caution to avoid being charged with a violation. For example, there is 
evidence that the hate speech policy adopted by the University of Wis-
consin in 1989 had this effect, even before it was directly enforced. A 
third problem inherent in any campus hate speech policy, as Lawrence 
concedes, is that such rules constitute a precedent that can be used to 
restrict other types of speech. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the 
long-range precedential impact of any challenged governmental action 
should be a factor in evaluating its lawfuJness.71 
Further, in light of constitutional constraints, any campus hate speech 
policy inevitably would apply to only a tiny &action of all racist expres-
sion, and accordingly it would have only a symbolic impact. Therefore, 
in deciding whether to adopt such a rule, universities must ask whether 
that symbolic impact is, on balance, positive or negative in terms of 
constitutional values. On the one hand, some advocates of hate speech 
regulations maintain that the regulations might play a valuable symbolic 
role in reaffirming our societal commitment to racial equality (although 
this is debatable). On the other hand, we must beware of even symbolic 
or perceived diminution of our impartial commitment to free speech. 
Even a limitation that has a direct impact upon only a discrete category 
of speech may have a much more pervasive indirect impact, by un-
dermining the First Amendment's moral legitimacy.72 Recently, the Su-
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preme Court ringingly reaffirmed the core principle that a neutral com-
mitment to free speech should trump competing symbolic concerns. In 
United States v. Eichman, which invalidated the Flag Protection Act of 
1989, the Court declared: 
Government may create national symbols, promote them, and encourage their 
respectful treatment. But the Flag Protection Act goes well beyond this by 
criminally proscribing expressive conduct because of its likely communicative 
impact. 
We are aware that desecration of the flag is deeply offensive to many. But the 
same might be said, for example, of virulent ethnic and religious epithets, vulgar 
repudiations of the draft, and scurrilous caricatures. "If there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not 
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because it finds the idea itself offensive 
or disagreeable." Punishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very freedom that 
makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering.73 
2. LAWRENCE'S CONCEPTION OF REGULABLE RACIST 
SPEECH ENDANGERS FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES 
T he preceding discussion of relevant constitutional doctrine points to 
several problems with the Stanford regulations, as well as other regula-
tions adopted or considered by other universities. As previously ex-
plained, the Stanford regulations viofate the cardinal principles that 
speech restrictions must be content- and viewpoint-neutral. Moreover, 
although these regulations purportedly incorporate the fighting words 
doctrine, they in fact go well beyond the narrow bounds that the Court 
has imposed on that doctrine, and they chill protected speech. 
A. The Proposed Regulations Would Not Pass Constitutional Muster 
r. The Regulations Exceed the Bounds of the Fighting Words Doctrine. 
As discussed above, the fighting words doctrine is fraught with constitu-
tional problems.74 As a result, it has been abrogated sub silentio and 
should be expressly invalidated (except to the very limited extent that it 
simply reflects the "clear and present danger" doctrine). In any event, 
even assuming that the doctrine is still good law, it has been severely 
circumscribed by Supreme Court rulings. Because those limits are neces-
sitated by free speech principles, they must be strictly enforced. 
Most recently and most pointedly, as previously discussed, in it 1992 
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decision in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court held that, to survive 
constitutional scrutiny, at the very least, fighting words regulations must 
be neutral in terms of the subject matter and the viewpoint of the 
targeted expression. For this reason alone, the First Amendment is vio-
lated by the Stanford policy, along with all other campus speech codes 
that prohibit only expression that conveys discriminatory ideas about 
race and other specified societal groupings. 
Additionally, even before its R.A. V. decision, the Court had pre-
scribed other limitations on the fighting words doctrine, which are also 
violated by campus speech codes of the type adopted by Stanford. Ste-
phen Gard's thorough study of the law in this area summarizes these 
pre-1992 limitations on the fighting words doctrine: 
The offending language (1) must constitute a personally abusive epithet, (2.) must 
be addressed in a face-to-face manner, (3) must be directed to a specific individ-
ual and be descriptive of that individual, and (4) must be uttered under such 
circumstances that the words have a direct tendency to cause an immediate 
violent response by the average recipient. If any of these four elements is absent, 
the doctrine may not justifiably be invoked as a rationale for the suppression of 
the expression.75 
The operative language of the Stanford code provides: 
Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by personal vilification if it: 
a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or small number of individ-
uals on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, 
or national and ethnic origin; and 
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or 
stigmatizes; and 
c) makes use of insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal symbols. In 
the context of discriminatory harassment by personal vilification, insulting or 
"fighting" words or non-verbal symbols are those "which by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite to an immediate breach of the peace," and which 
are commonly understood to convey direct and visceral hatred or contempt for 
human beings on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual 
orientation, or national and ethnic origin. 
A comparison of the Stanford code to the Supreme Court's four pre-
1992 criteria for constitutional fighting words restrictions, as summa-
rized by Gard, reveals that the code clearly does not satisfy one of the 
Court's criteria, and it may not satisfy the other three either. Most 
importantly, as previously explained, since its 1972 decision in Gooding 
v. Wilson, the Court consistently has invalidated fighting words defini-
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tions that refer only to the nature of the words. Instead, it has insisted 
that these words must be evaluated contextually, to assess whether 
they are likely to cause an imminent breach of the peace under the 
circumstances in which they are uttered. (This requirement is set forth in 
Gard's fourth criterion.) Yet the Stanford code punishes words "which 
are commonly understood to convey" group-based hatred. By categori-
cally proscribing certain words, without considering their context, the 
Stanford code falls afoul of the First Amendment. 76 
2. The Regulations Will Chill Protected Speech. Beyond its facial prob-
lems of violating content and viewpoint neutrality principles and fighting 
words limitations, the Stanford code also will dampen academic dis-
course. This inevitable outcome is indicated by the experience under the 
University of Michigan hate speech regulation.77 
Even though the Michigan regulation was in some respects broader 
than its Stanford counterpart, the latter rule also suffers from facial 
overbreadth and ambiguity. One of the key terms in the Stanford regula-
tion, the term "stigmatize," also was contained in the Michigan policy 
and specifically was ruled unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, the 
Stanford code appears to be as constitutionally suspect as the Michigan 
rule, contrary to Lawrence's assumption. 
In Doe v. University of Michigan, 78 the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the University of Michi-
gan's anti-hate speech policy violated the First Amendment because, as 
applied, it was overbroad and impermissibly vague. The court concluded 
that during the year when the policy was in effect, the University "con-
sistently applied" it "to reach protected speech." 79 Moreover, because 
of the policy's vagueness, the court concluded that it did not give ade-
quate notice of which particular expressions would be prohibited and 
which protected. Consequently, the policy deterred members of the uni-
versity community from engaging in protected expression for fear it 
might be sanctioned. This "chilling effect" of any hate speech regulation 
is particularly problematic in the academic environment, given the spe-
cial importance of a free and robust exchange of ideas there. 
The judge who ultimately found the Michigan rule unconstitutional 
did not share Lawrence's opinion that it was "poorly drafted and obvi-
ously overbroad." 80 To the contrary, his opinion expressly noted that 
he would not have found the rule unconstitutionally overbroad merely 
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based on its language. Rather, he found it unconstitutional in light of 
the enforcement record. These findings show the relevance of the Michi-
gan case not only to the Stanford situation, but also to all other campus 
hate speech regulations. Regardless of how carefully these rules are 
drafted, they inevitably are vague and unavoidably invest officials with 
substantial discretion in the enforcement process; thus, such regulations 
exert a chilling effect on speech beyond their literal bounds. Accordingly, 
even though the University of Wisconsin's hate speech policy was some-
what narrower than the University of Michigan's policy, it too was ruled 
to be substantially overbroad and unduly vague, thus violating the First 
Amendrnent.81 As Eleanor Holmes Norton has cautioned, "It is techni-
cally impossible to write an anti-speech code that cannot be twisted 
against speech nobody means to bar." 82 
In the recent wave of college crackdowns on racist and other forms of 
hate speech, examples abound of attempts to censor speech conveying 
ideas that clearly play a legitimate role in academic discourse, although 
some of us might find them wrongheaded or even odious. For example, 
the University of Michigan's anti-hate speech policy could justify attacks 
on author Salman Rushdie's book, The Satanic Verses, on the ground 
that it was offensive to Muslims.83 
Such incidents are not aberrational. Any anti-hate speech rule ines-
capably entails some vagueness, due to the inherent imprecision of key 
words and concepts common to all such proposed rules. For example, 
most regulations employ one or more of the following ambiguous terms: 
"demeaning," "disparaging," "hostile," "insulting," and "stigmatiz-
ing." Therefore, there is real danger that even a narrowly crafted rule 
will deter some expression that should be protected, especially in the 
university environment.84 In particular, such a rule probably will add to 
the silence on "gut issues" about racism, sexism, and other forms of bias 
that already impede interracial and other intergroup dialogues. 
Additionally, it must be recognized that silencing certain expressions 
may be tantamount to silencing certain ideas. 85 As the plaintiff in Doe 
v. Michigan argued: 
[T]he policy ... is an official statement that at the University of Michigan, some 
arguments will no longer be tolerated. Rather than encourage her maturing 
students to question each other's ·beliefs on such diverse and controversial issues 
as the proper role of women in society, the merits of particular religions, or the 
moral propriety of homosexuality, the University has decided that it must pro-
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tect its students from what it considers to be "unenlightened" ideas. In so doing, 
the University has established a secular orthodoxy by implying, among other 
things, that homosexuality is morally acceptable, [and] that ... feminism [is] 
superior to the traditional view of women. 86 
The Michigan plaintiff was victimized directly by the "pall of ortho-
doxy" 87 that the university's anti-hate speech policy cast over the cam-
pus. As a graduate student specializing in behavioral psychology, he felt 
that the rule deterred him from classroom discussion of theories that 
some psychological differences among racial groups and between the 
sexes are related to biological differences, for fear of being charged with 
racial or sexual harassment. 
In addition to their chilling effect on the ideas and expressions of 
university community members, policies that bar hate speech could also 
engender broader forms of censorship. As noted by William Cohen of 
Stanford Law School, an anti-hate speech rule such as the one adopted 
by his university "purports to create a personal right to be free from 
involuntary exposure to any form of expression that gives certain kinds 
of offense." Therefore, he explains, such a rule "could become a sword 
to challenge assigned readings in courses, the showing of films on cam-
pus, or the message of certain speakers." 88 
B. The Proposed Regulations Would Endanger Fundamental Free 
Speech Principles 
The various proposed campus hate speech regulations, including the 
Stanford code that Lawrence endorses, are not only inconsistent with 
current Supreme Court doctrine prescribing permissible limits on speech. 
Even more problematic is the fact that they jeopardize basic free speech 
principles. Whereas certain conduct may be regulable, speech that advo-
cates such conduct is not, and speech may not be regulated on the basis 
of its content or viewpoint, even if many of us strongly disagree with-
or, worse yet, are repelled by-that content or viewpoint. 
I. Protection of Speech Advocating Regulable Conduct. Civil libertari-
ans, scholars, and judges consistently have distinguished between speech 
advocating unlawful conduct and the unlawful conduct itself. Although 
this distinction has been drawn in numerous different factual settings, 
the fundamental underlying issues always are the same. For example, 
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within recent years, some pro-choice activists have urged civil libertari-
ans and courts to make an exception to free speech principles in order to 
restrain the expressive conduct of anti-abortion activists. Instead, civil 
libertarians have persuaded courts to prohibit assaults, blockages of 
clinic entrances, trespasses, and other illegal conduct by anti-choice 
activists. Similarly, civil libertarians and courts have rejected pleas by 
some feminists to condone an exception to free speech guarantees for 
sexually explicit materials that reflect sexist attitudes. Instead, civil liber-
tarians have renewed their efforts to persuade courts and legislatures to 
invalidate sexist actions. A decade ago, civil libertarians and several 
courts-including the Supreme Court-rejected the plea of Holocaust 
survivors in Skokie, Illinois, to prohibit neo-Nazis from peacefully dem-
onstrating. Instead, civil libertarians successfully have lobbied for the 
enactment and enforcement of laws against anti-Semitic vandalism and 
other hate-inspired conduct. 
A pervasive weakness in Lawrence's analysis is his elision of the 
distinction between racist speech, on the one hand, and racist conduct, 
on the other. 89 It is certainly true that racist speech, like other speech, 
may have some causal connection to conduct. As Justice Holmes ob-
served, "[e)very idea is an incitement" to action.90 However, as Justice 
Holmes also noted, to protect speech that advocates conduct you oppose 
does not " indicate that you think the speech impotent, ... or that you 
do not care wholeheartedly for the result." 9 1 Rather, this protection is 
based on the critical distinction between speech that has a direct and 
immediate link to unlawful conduct and all other speech, which has less 
direct and immediate links. In Holmes's immortal words: 
[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of 
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so 
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing pur-
poses of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country .... 
Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction 
of evil counsels to rime warrants making any exception to the sweeping com-
mand, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." 92 
Justice Holmes's stirring phrases were penned in dissenting opinions. 
However, the Court enshrined his view as the Law of the land in 1969, 
in Brandenburg v. Ohio. 93 In a unanimous opinion overturning the 
conviction of a Ku Klux Klansman for an anti-black and anti-Semitic 
speech, the Court said that the First Amendment does "not permit a 
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state to forbid ... advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 94 
2. Proscription on Content-Based Speech Regulations. 
a. The indivisibility of free speech. It is important to place the current 
debate about campus racist speech in the context of efforts to censor 
other forms of hate speech. Such a broadened perspective suggests that 
consistent principles should be applied each time the issue resurfaces in 
any guise. Every person may find one particular type of speech especially 
odious, and one message may most sorely test his or her dedication to 
free speech values. But for each person who would exclude racist speech 
from the general proscription against content- or viewpoint-based 
speech regulations, recent experience shows that there is another who 
would make such an exception only for anti-choice speech, another who 
would make it only for sexist speech, another who would make it 
only for anti-Semitic speech, another who would make it only for flag 
desecration, another who would make it only for speech at odds with 
traditional religious or moral values, and so on. 
The recognition that there is no principled basis for curbing speech 
that expresses some particular ideas is reflected in the time-honored 
prohibition on any content- or viewpoint-based regulations. As stated 
by Laurence Tribe, "If the Constitution forces government to allow 
people to march, speak, and write in favor of peace, brotherhood, and 
justice, then it must also require government to allow them to advocate 
hatred, racism, and even genocide." 95 
The position stated by Tribe is not just the traditional civil libertarian 
view, but it also is the law of the land. The courts consistently have 
agreed with civil libertarian claims that the First Amendment protects 
the right to engage in racist and other forms of hate speech. Why is this 
so, and should it be so? Lawrence rightly urges us to take a fresh look at 
this issue, no matter how well settled it is as a matter of law. I have 
taken that invitation seriously and reflected long and hard upon his 
thought-provoking analysis and the questions it presents. Having done 
so, however, I conclude that the courts and traditional civil libertarians 
are correct in steadfastly rejecting laws that create additional new excep-
tions to free speech protections for racist expression. 
One longstanding rationale for the view that speech must be pro-
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tected, regardless of its content or views, is the belief that we need a free 
marketplace of ideas, open even to the most odious and offensive ideas 
and expressions, because truth ultimately will triumph in an unrestricted 
marketplace.96 The marketplace metaphor is subject to some criticism, 
as Lawrence notes. Nevertheless, the marketplace of ideas does some-
times work to improve society: this has been particularly true with 
regard to the promotion of racial equality. Moreover, there are other, 
independently sufficient rationales for the content- and viewpoint-neu-
tral protection even of hate speech. Another important, more recently 
articulated rationale is that freedom of expression promotes individual 
autonomy and dignity.97 Lawrence himself endorses an additional the-
ory for the protection of racist speech, a view that has been advanced by 
Lee Bollinger: free speech reinforces our society's commitment to toler-
ance and to combating racist ideas.98 
Although the foregoing theories may be acceptable in general, one 
might ask why they do not permit exceptions for racist speech. Racism 
in America is unique in important respects. For most of our country's 
history, racism was enshrined legally through slavery or de jure discrimi-
nation. The post-Civil War constitutional amendments guaranteed racial 
equality. More recently, all branches and levels of the government have 
sought to implement these constitutional guarantees by outlawing any 
vestiges of state-sponsored, as well as many forms of private, racial 
discrimination. Given our nation's special obligation to eradicate the 
"badges and incidents" of the formerly government-sanctioned institu-
tions of racism, is it not appropriate to make broader exceptions than 
usual to free speech doctrines for racist speech? As Rodney Smolla has 
noted, "Racist speech is arguably different in kind from other offensive 
speech, because the elimination of racism is itself enshrined in our Con-
stitution as a public value of the highest order." 99 
The American commitment to eradicate racial discrimination is rein-
forced by a parallel international commitment, as expressed in such 
documents as the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and the International Convention on the Elimination of 
AJI Forms of Racial Discrimination. Moreover, the United States is 
apparently alone in the world community in sheltering racist speech. 
Both under international agreements and under the domestic law of 
many other countries, racist speech is outlawed. 
In light of the universal condemnation of racial discrimination and 
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the worldwide regulation of racist speech, it certainly is tempting to 
consider excepting racist speech from First Amendment protection. Epi-
sodes of racist speech, such as those cited by Lawrence and others, make 
a full commitment to free speech at times seem painful and difficult. 
Civil libertarians certainly find such speech abhorrent, given our dedica-
tion to eradicating racial discrimination and other forms of bigotry. 
But experience has confirmed the truth of the indivisibility principle 
articulated above: history demonstrates that if the freedom of speech is 
weakened for one person, group, or message, then it is no longer there 
for others. The free speech victories that civil libertarians have won in 
the context of defending the right to express racist and other anti-civil 
libertarian messages have been used to protect speech proclaiming anti-
racist and pro-civil libertarian messages. For example, in 1949, the 
ACLU defended the right of Father Terminiello, a suspended Catholic 
priest, to give a racist speech in Chicago. The Supreme Court agreed 
with that position in a decision that became a landmark in free speech 
history.100 Time and again during the 1960s and 1970s, the ACLU and 
other civil rights groups were able to defend free speech rights for civil 
rights demonstrators by relying on the Terminiello decision. 
b. The slippery slope dangers of banning racist speech. To attempt to 
craft free speech exceptions only for racist speech would create a signifi-
cant risk of a slide down the proverbial "slippery slope." To be sure, 
lawyers and judges are capable of-indeed, especially trained in-draw-
ing distinctions between similar situations. Therefore, I agree with Law-
rence and other critics of the absolutist position that slippery slope 
dangers should not be exaggerated. It is probably hyperbole to contend 
that if we ever stepped off the mountaintop where all speech is protected 
regardless of its content, we would inevitably end up in the abyss where 
the government controls all our words. On the other hand, critics of 
absolutism should not minimize the real danger: we would have an 
extremely difficult time limiting our descent to a single downward step 
by attempting to prohibit only racist expression on campus. It would be 
very hard to craft applicable rules and supporting rationales that would 
meaningfully distinguish this type of speech from others. 
First, hard questions would be presented about the groups that should 
be protected. Should we regulate speech aimed only at racial and ethnic 
groups, as the University of Texas considered? Or should we also bar 
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insults of religious groups, women, gay men and lesbians, individuals 
with disabilities, Vietnam War veterans, and so on, as do the rules 
adopted by Stanford and the University of Michigan? 
Second, it would be highly challenging to define proscribable harass-
ing speech without encompassing important expression that should be 
protected. Censorial consequences would likely result from all proposed 
or adopted university policies, including the Stanford code, which sanc-
tion speech intended to "insult or stigmatize" on the basis of race or 
other prohibited grounds. For example, certain feminists suggest that all 
heterosexual sex is tantamount to rape because heterosexual men are 
aggressors who operate in a cultural climate of pervasive sexism and 
violence against women. Aren't these feminists insulting or stigmatizing 
heterosexual men on the basis of their sex and sexual orientation? And 
how about a Holocaust survivor who blames all ("Aryan") Germans for 
their collaboration during World War II? Doesn't this insult or stigma-
tize on the basis of national and ethnic origin? And surely we can think 
of numerous other examples that would have to give us pause. 
The difficulty of formulating limited, clear definitions of prohibited 
hate speech, which do not encompass valuable contributions to societal 
discourse, is underscored by the seemingly intractable ambiguities in 
various campus rules. Even proponents of campus hate speech regula-
tions recognize their inevitable ambiguities and necessarily contextual-
ized applications, with the result that the individuals who enforce them 
must have substantial discretion to draw distinctions based upon the 
particular facts and circumstances involved in any given case. Richard 
Delgado, an early advocate of rules proscribing hate speech, acknowl-
edged that the offensiveness of even such a traditionally insulting epithet 
as "nigger" would depend on the context in which it was uttered, since 
it could be a term of affection when exchanged between friends. 101 The 
imprecise nature of racist speech regulations is underscored further by 
the fact that even their proponents are unsure or disagree as to their 
applicability in particular situations. 102 
Once we acknowledge the substantial discretion that anti-hate speech 
rules will vest in those who enforce them, then we are ceding to the 
government the power to pick and choose whose words to protect and 
whose to punish. Such discretionary governmental power is fundamen-
tally antithetical to the free speech guarantee. As soon as the government 
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is allowed to punish any speech based upon its content, free expression 
exists only for those with power. 
c. The content- and viewpoint-neutrality principles reflect sensitivity 
to hate speech's hurtful power. Contrary to Lawrence's apparent as-
sumption, the conclusion that free speech protections must remain indi-
visible, even for racist speech, has nothing to do with insensitivity to the 
feelings of minority group members who are vilified by hate speech and 
suffer acutely from it. Traditional civil libertarians recognize the power 
of words to inflict psychic and even physiological harm. For example, 
precisely because the ACLU both acknowledges the power of speech and 
defends the exercise of that power even by those who express anti-civil 
libertarian ideas, the ACLU expressly dissociates itself from such ideas 
and makes it a priority to combat them through counterspeech and 
action. Nor are traditional civil libertarians unconcerned with the rights 
of hate speech victims, as Lawrence implies. To the contrary, civil liber-
tarians champion the rights of all individuals to live in a society un-
tainted by racism and other forms of bias; since its founding in 1920, 
the ACLU has directed considerable resources and efforts toward secur-
ing these rights. 
I was appalled by Lawrence's account of the vicious racist vilification 
to which his sister's family recently was subjected.103 This account pow-
erfully demonstrates that the old nursery rhyme is wrong: maybe words 
are different from sticks and stones insofar as they cannot literally break 
our bones, but words can and do hurt-brutally. 
Two prominent defenders of content-neutral protection for hate 
speech have described painful personal experiences as victims of such 
speech. I refer to Stanford law professor Gerald Gunther, who was a 
leading opponent of the proposed Stanford code that Lawrence advo-
cates, 104 and Aryeh Neier, who as executive director of the ACLU during 
the Skokie episode vigorously championed the free speech rights of 
racists and anti-Semites.105 Far from opposing censorship despite the 
suffering they personally experienced as a result of hate speech, 
Gunther 106 and Neier 107 oppose censorship precisely because of these 
personal experiences. The justification for not outlawing "words that 
wound" is not based on a failure to recognize the injurious potential of 
words. The refusal to ban words is due precisely to our understanding 
both of how very powerful they are and of the critical role they play in 
our democratic society. 
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3. LAWRENCE'S RATIONALES FOR REGULATING RACIST 
SPEECH WOULD JUSTIFY SWEEPING PROHIBITIONS, 
CONTRARY TO FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES 
Although Lawrence actually advocates regulating only a relatively nar-
row category of racist speech, his rationales could be asserted to justify 
broader rules. Indeed, he himself appears to recognize that, if accepted, 
his approach could lead to outlawing all racist speech, as well as other 
forms of hate speech. Since many universities and individuals have advo-
cated broader-ranging regulations-and since Lawrence also endorses 
restrictions that have a "considerably broader reach" than the Stanford 
code 108- it is important to consider the problems with Lawrence's more 
expansive rationales. His general theories about racist speech entail 
substantial departures from traditional civil libertarian and constitu-
tional law positions. 
A. Brown and Other Cases Invalidating Governmental Racist Conduct 
Do Not Justify Regulating Nongovernmental Racist Speech 
Lawrence intriguingly posits that Brown v. Board of Education, 109 Bob 
Jones University v. United States, 110 and other civil rights cases justify 
regulation of private racist speech.111 The problem with drawing an 
analogy between all of these cases and the subject at hand is that the 
cases involved either government speech, as opposed to speech by pri-
vate individuals, or conduct, as opposed to speech. Indeed, Brown itself 
is distinguishable on both grounds. 
I. The Speech/Conduct Distinction. First, the governmental defendant 
in Brown-the Topeka, Kansas, Board of Education-was not simply 
saying that blacks are inferior. Rather, it was treating them as inferior 
through pervasive patterns of conduct, by maintaining systems and 
structures of segregated public schools. To be sure, a by-product of the 
challenged conduct was a message, but that message was only incidental. 
Saying that black children are unfit to attend school with whites is 
materially distinguishable from legally prohibiting them from doing so, 
despite the fact that the legal prohibition may convey the former 
message. 
Lawrence's point proves too much. If incidental messages could trans-
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form conduct into speech, then the distinction between speech and con-
duct would disappear completely, because all conduct conveys a mes-
sage. To take an extreme example, a racially motivated lynching 
expresses the murderer's hatred or contempt for his victim. But the 
clearly unlawful act is not protected from punishment by virtue of the 
incidental message it conveys. And the converse also is true. Just because 
the government may in effect suppress particular hate messages that are 
the by-product of unlawful conduct that it directly prohibits, it does not 
follow that the government may directly suppress all hate messages. 
Those messages not tightly linked to conduct that is independently un-
lawful must still be protected. 
The Supreme Court has recognized these critical distinctions by sub-
jecting to more demanding First Amendment scrutiny governmental 
measures that directly target the expressive element of expressive con-
duct. When a governmental measure seeks to regulate the communica-
tive aspect of expressive conduct, the measure is presumptively unconsti-
tutional. In contrast, when a governmental measure seeks to regulate 
the noncommunicative aspect of expressive conduct, the measure is 
presumptively constitutional. For example, in United States v. 
O'Brien,112 the Court upheld a statute that criminalized the destruction 
of draft cards, because it concluded that the government's interest was 
limited to the nonexpressive aspect of this conduct. Conversely, in two 
later decisions, the Court struck down laws criminalizing the burning of 
the American flag, 113 because it concluded that these laws aimed at the 
expressive aspect of the forbidden conduct. 
Brown v. Board of Education does not constitute a precedent for 
regulating racist hate speech precisely because of these critical distinc-
tions. The Brown Court's invalidation of laws mandating racially segre-
gated schools was not aimed at the expressive aspect of those laws. 114 In 
stark contrast, anti-hate speech rules are aimed squarely at the commu-
nicative aspect of any expressive conduct. 
2. The Private Action/State Action Distinction. Even if Brown had 
involved only a governmental message of racism, without any attendant 
conduct, that case still would be distinguishable in a crucial way from a 
private individual's conveyance of the same message. Under the post-
Civil War constitutional amendments, the government is committed to 
eradicating all badges and incidents of slavery, including racial discrimi-
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nation. Consistent with the paramount importance of this obligation, 
the Supreme Court has held that the equal protection clause bars the 
government from lending textbooks to racially discriminatory private 
schools, 115 even though the Court had held previously that the establish-
ment clause does not bar the government from lending textbooks to 
private religious schools. 116 In this respect, the government's constitu-
tional duty to dissociate itself from racism is even greater than its consti-
tutional duty to dissociate itself from religion. The government's su-
preme obligation to counter racism clearly is incompatible with racist 
speech promulgated by the government itself. Private individuals, 
though, have no comparable duty. 
Mari Matsuda has argued that the government's failure to punish 
private hate speech could be viewed as state action insofar as this failure 
conveys a message that the state tolerates such speech. Because the Court 
construes the First Amendment's establishment clause as prohibiting 
government action that conveys a message of state support for reli-
gion, 117 establishment clause cases constitute instructive precedents for 
evaluating Matsuda's argument. In the analogous establishment clause 
conu:xr, the Court repeatedly has held that the government's neutral 
tolerance and protection of private religious expression, along with all 
other expression, does not convey a message that the government en-
dorses religion. In its 1990 decision in Board of Education of Westside 
Community Schools v. Mergens, 118 the Court expressly reaffirmed the 
crucial distinction between government and private speech, in the estab-
lishment clause context, in terms fully applicable to the racist speech 
controversy. The Court declared, "[T]here is a crucial difference between 
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause 
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech 
and Free Exercise Clauses protect." 119 Paraphrasing this language and 
applying it to the hate speech context, one could say, "There is a crucial 
difference between government speech endorsing racism, which the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing racism, 
which the Free Speech Clause protects." 
In light of the government's special duty to dissociate itself from 
racism, one might try to distinguish private religious speech from private 
racist speech- much as the Court distinguished textbook loans to ra-
cially discriminatory private religious schools from the same kind of 
loans to private religious schools. However, the direct, tangible, explicit 
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government support of racially discriminatory schools through textbook 
lending programs is critically different from the indirect, intangible, 
implicit government support allegedly lent to racist conduct by the gov-
ernment's failure to outlaw private racist speech. 
Lawrence makes a telling point when he says that our government 
never has repudiated the group libels it perpetrated for years against 
blacks and that it is insufficient for the government simply to cease 
uttering those libels. Accordingly, one strategy for promoting racial 
equality, which is consistent with free speech, is to urge the government 
to proclaim anti-racist messages. The ACLU policy on campus hate 
speech (which is set out in the appendix to this chapter) expressly 
endorses this strategy. 
Lawrence also makes the persuasive point that there is no absolute 
distinction between state and private action in the racist sphere, insofar 
as private acts of discrimination (as well as government acts) also are 
unlawful. This point, however, raises the other distinction discussed 
above-the distinction between words and conduct. Civil libertarians 
vigorously support the civil rights laws that make private discriminatory 
acts illegal, but that is a far cry from making private speech illegal. The 
Bob Jones case, 120 upon which Lawrence seeks to rely, illustrates this 
critical distinction. What was objectionable there was the government 
conduct that supported and endorsed the private racist conduct-
namely, the government's financial contributions, through the tax sys-
tem, to racially discriminatory private educational institutions. More-
over, even if a private university could be prohibited from undertaking 
discriminatory actions-in the case of Bob Jones University, barring 
interracial marriage and dating-it still could not be prohibited from 
advocating such actions. The ACLU amicus brief in the Bob Jones case 
made precisely these points in countering the university's claim that 
withdrawing its tax benefits would violate its First Amendment rights. 
The ACLU argued, and the Court agreed, that the university was still 
free to urge its students not to engage in interracial marriage or dating, 
and that this was as far as its First Amendment rights extended. Prohib-
ited racist acts are no different from other prohibited acts. The govern-
ment may punish the acts, but it may not punish words that advocate or 
endorse them. 
The other cases upon which Lawrence premises his argument also do 
not authorize the regulation of private racist speech. For example, he 
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draws a false analogy between private racist speech and a local govern-
ment's financing of allegedly "private" segregated (all-white) schools, 
after the government had closed down public schools in defiance of 
desegregation orders. Lawrence misreads these cases, which invalidated 
tangible government support for segregated schools, as standing for the 
proposition "that the defamatory message of segregation would not be 
insulated from constitutional proscription simply because the speaker 
was a non-government entity." 121 For example, in Griffin v. Prince 
Edward County School Board, 122 the Supreme Court held that the 
governmental financing of segregated schools constituted prohibited 
state action. In contrast, had individual school district residents urged 
their government to undertake such action, or expressed their support 
for such action to black residents, that would have constituted protected 
private speech.123 
B. The Nonintellectual Content of Some Racist Speech Does Not 
Justify Its Prohibition 
In addition to his principal argument that private racist speech may be 
regulated because it is indistinguishable from governmental racist con-
duct, Lawrence offers a second purported justification for restricting 
racist speech. He contends that "[a] defining attribute of speech is that it 
appeals first to the mind of the hearer who can evaluate its truth or 
persuasiveness," 124 and that because certain racist speech lacks this 
attribute, it should not be viewed as speech. This position is inconsistent 
with fundamental free speech values. 
Lawrence's argument overlooks the teachings of such landmark Su-
preme Court decisions as Terminiello v. Chicago 125 and Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 126 which recognize that protectible speech often appeals to the 
emotions as well as the mind. As early as 1948, the Court recognized 
that First Amendment protection is not restricted to the "exposition of 
ideas." 127 As Justice Douglas declared in a celebrated passage in Termi-
niello: 
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. 
It may indeed best serve irs high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, 
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. 
Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and 
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance 
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of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless 
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a 
clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. There is no room under our Constitution 
for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of 
ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community 
groups.12a 
Justice Harlan 129 echoed this theme in Cohen when he explained that 
protectible expression 
conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but 
otherwise inexpressible emotions as we.II. In fact, words are often chosen as 
much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view 
that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual 
speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically 
speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message 
sought to be communicated.130 
Together, Terminiello and Cohen recognize that speech often ex-
presses the speaker's emotions and appeals to the audience's emotions. 
This generalization applies not only to the ugly words of racist vitupera-
tion, but also to the beautiful words of poetry. Indeed, much indisput-
ably valuable language, as well as expressive conduct, has the intention 
and effect of appealing not directly or not only to the mind. Such 
language also seeks to and does engage the audience's emotions. If 
emotion-provoking discourse were denied protected status, then much 
political speech-which is usually viewed as being at the apex of First 
Amendment protection-would fall outside the protected realm. The 
Court in Terminiello and Cohen rejected the restricted First Amendment 
paradigm of "a sedate assembly of speakers who calmly discussed the 
issues of the day and became ultimately persuaded by the logic of one of 
the competing positions." 131 
Lawrence reveals his narrower view when he asks, "[A]re racial in-
sults ideas? Do they encourage wide-open debate?" 132 In light of the 
Terminiello-Cohen line of cases, Lawrence wrongly implies that a nega-
t ive response to these questions should remove racial insults from the 
domain of protected speech. Lawrence also incorrectly implies that the 
response to these questions should be negative. Racial insults convey 
ideas of racial supremacy and inferiority. Objectionable and discredited 
as these ideas may be, they are ideas nonetheless. 
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4. PROHIBITING RACIST SPEECH WOULD NOT EFFECTIVELY 
COUNTER, AND COULD EVEN AGGRAVATE, THE 
UNDERLYING PROBLEM OF RACISM 
A. Civil Libertarians Should Continue to Make Combating 
Racism a Priority 
Despite Lawrence's proffered justifications for regulating a broader spec-
trum of racist speech, he in fact advocates regulating only a quite limited 
category of such speech. Thus, even Lawrence's views of regulable 
speech, although broader than those of the Supreme Court or traditional 
civil libertarians, would allow most racist speech on campus. 
I do not think it is worth spending a great deal of time debating the 
fine points of specific rules o r their particular applications to achieve 
what necessarily will be only marginal differences in the amount of racist 
insults that can be sanctioned. The larger problems of racist attitudes 
and conduct-of which all these words are symptoms-would remain. 
Those who share the dual goals of promoting racial equality and pro-
tecting free speech must concentrate on countering racial discrimination, 
rather than on defining the particular narrow subset of racist slurs that 
constitutionally might be regulable. 
I welcome Lawrence's encouragement to civil libertarians to "engage 
actively in speech and action that resists and counters the racist ideas the 
first amendment protects." 133 But Lawrence need not urge traditional 
civil libertarians to "put[ ) at least as much effort and as many resources 
into fighting for the victims of racism as we put into protecting the rights 
of racists." 134 The ACLU, for example, always has put far more effort 
and resources into assisting the victims of racism than into defending the 
rights of racists. 
Although ACLU cases involving the Ku Klux Klan and other racist 
speakers often generate a disproportionate amount of publicity, they 
constitute only a tiny fraction (approximately one-tenth of one percent) 
of the ACLU's caseload. In the recent past, the ACLU has handled about 
six cases a year advocating the free speech rights of white supremacists, 
out of a total of more than six thousand cases, and these white suprema-
cist cases rarely consume significant resources. Moreover, the resources 
the ACLU does expend to protect hatemongers' First Amendment rights 
are well invested. They ultimately preserve not only civil liberties, but 
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also our democratic system, for the benefit of all. Aryeh Neier persua-
sively drew this conclusion, for example, with respect to the ACLU's 
defense of the American Nazi party's right to demonstrate in Skokie: 
[W)hen it was all over no one had been persuaded to join [the Nazis]. They had 
disseminated their message and it had been rejected. 
Why djd the Nazi message fall on such deaf ears? Revolutionaries and advo-
cates of destruction attract followers readily when the society they wish to 
overturn loses legitimacy. Understanding thjs process, revolutionaries try to 
provoke the government into using repressive measures. They rejoice, as the 
American Nazis rud, when their rights are denied to them; they count on 
repression to win them sympathizers. 
In confronting the Nazis, however, American democracy djd not lose, but 
preserved its legitimacy . ... 
The judges who devoted so much attention to the Nazis, the police depart-
ments that paid so much overtime, and the American Civil Liberties Union, 
which lost a half-million dollars in membership income as a consequence of its 
defense, used their time and money well. They defeated the Nazis by preserving 
the legitimacy of American democracy.135 
In contrast with its small, albeit important, investment in protecting 
the free speech rights of racists, the ACLU has throughout its history 
devoted substantial resources to the struggle against racism. The ACLU 
backed the civil rights movement in its early years, working with lawyers 
from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
to plan the attack on segregation. In 1931, the ACLU published Black 
Justice, a comprehensive report on legalized racism. The ACLU also 
played an important role in the infamous Scottsboro cases, in which 
seven young black men were convicted of raping two white women after 
sham trials before an all-white jury; an ACLU attorney argued and won 
the first of these cases to reach the Supreme Court. 
During World War II, the ACLU sponsored a challenge to the segre-
gated draft and organized the Committee Against Racial Discrimination. 
In the 1950s, the ACLU successfully challenged state laws that made it a 
crime for a white woman to bear a child she had conceived with a black 
father. In the 1960s, the ACLU provided funds and lawyers to defend 
civil rights activists, and since then it has lobbied extensively for civil 
rights legislation. 
The ACLU's Voting Rights Project has helped to empower black 
voters throughout the southern United States, facilitating the election of 
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hundreds of black officials. The ACLU also maintains several other 
special "Projects" whose constituents or clients are (alas) predominantly 
black-for example, the Capital Punishment Project, the Children's 
Rights Project, and the National Prison Project. Since the late 1980s, the 
ACLU's national legal department has focused on civil liberties issues 
related to race and poverty, and has won pathbreaking victories in cases 
involving racial discrimination in education and housing. In addition, 
state and local-level branches of the ACLU consistently allocate substan-
tial resources to civil rights cases. 
As indicated by both policy and action, the ACLU is committed to 
eradicating racial discrimination on campus as an essential step toward 
its larger goal of eliminating racial discrimination from society at large. 
For example, ACLU leaders have corresponded and met with university 
officials to recommend measures that they could implement to combat 
campus racism, consistent with both equality and free speech values. In 
the same vein, ACLU officials have worked for the implementation of 
educational programs designed to counter racist attitudes among college 
students, as well as younger students. Additionally, ACLU representa-
tives have participated in universities' deliberations about whether to 
adopt anti-hate speech rules, and if so, how to frame them. Representa-
tives of the ACLU have also organized investigations of racist incidents 
at specific campuses, for purposes of advising university officials about 
how to respond to and prevent such problems. Furthermore, ACLU 
officials have organized and participated in protests of racist incidents, 
both on campus and more generally. 
In light of these efforts, Lawrence's suggestion that "the call for 
fighting racist attitudes and practices rather than speech [is) 'just a lot of 
cheap talk' " 136 is a cheap shot. In particular, it is noteworthy that the 
ACLU affiliates that have brought lawsuits challenging campus hate 
speech regulations also have undertaken specific efforts to counter cam-
pus and societal racism. 137 Moreover, the charge of "cheap talk" more 
appropriately might be leveled at those who focus their attention on hate 
speech regulations. Such regulations may appear to provide a relatively 
inexpensive "quick fix," but racist speech is only one symptom of the 
pervasive problem of racism, and this underlying problem will not be 
solved by banning one of its symptoms. 
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B. Punishing Racist Speech Would Not Effectively Counter Racism 
Parts 2 and 3 of this chapter emphasized the principled reasons, arising 
from First Amendment theory, for concluding that racist speech should 
receive the same protection as other offensive speech. This conclusion is 
also supported by pragmatic or strategic considerations concerning the 
efficacious pursuit of equality goals. Not only would rules censoring 
racist speech fail to reduce racial bias, but they might well even under-
mine that goal. 
First, there is no persuasive psychological evidence that punishment 
for name-calling changes deeply held attitudes. To the contrary, histori-
cal experience and psychological studies show that censored speech 
becomes more appealing and persuasive to many listeners merely by 
virtue of the censorship. 
Nor is there any empirical evidence, from the countries that do out-
law racist speech, that censorship is an effective means to counter rac-
ism. For example, Great Britain began to prohibit racist defamation in 
1965. Almost three decades later, this law has had no discernible adverse 
impact on the National Front and other neo-Nazi groups active in 
Britain. As discussed above, it is impossible to draw narrow regulations 
that precisely specify the particular words and contexts that should lead 
to sanctions. Fact-bound determinations are required. For this reason, 
authorities have great discretion in determining precisely which speakers 
and which words to punish. Consequently, even vicious racist epithets 
have gone unpunished under British law.138 Moreover, even if actual or 
threatened enforcement of the law has deterred some overt racist insults, 
that enforcement has had no effect on more subtle, but nevertheless 
clear signals of racism. Some obse.rvers believe that racism is even more 
pervasive in Britain than in the United States. 139 
C. Banning Racist Speech Could Aggravate Racism 
For several reasons, banning the symptom of racist speech may com-
pound the underlying problem of racism. Lawrence sets up a false di-
chotomy when he urges us to balance equality goals against free speech 
goals. Just as he observes that free speech concerns should be weighed 
on the pro-regulation as well as the anti-regulation side of the balance, 
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he should recognize that equality concerns weigh on the anti-regulation 
as well as the pro-regulation side. 
The first reason that laws censoring racist speech may undermine the 
goal of combating racism flows from the discretion such laws inevitably 
vest in the prosecutors, judges, and other individuals who implement 
them. One ironic, even tragic, result of this discretion is that members of 
minority groups themselves-the very people whom the law is intended 
to protect-are likely targets of punishment. For example, among the 
first individuals prosecuted under the British Race Relations Act of 
1965, which criminalized the incitement of racial hatred, were black-
power leaders. Their overtly racist messages undoubtedly expressed le-
gitimate anger at real discrimination, yet the statute drew no such fine 
lines, nor could any similar statute possibly do so. Rather than curbing 
speech offensive to minorities, this British law instead has been regularly 
used to curb the speech of blacks, trade unionists, and anti-nuclear 
activists. In perhaps the ultimate irony, this statute, which was intended 
to restrain the neo-Nazi National Front, instead has barred expression 
by the Anti-Nazi League. 
The British experience is not unique. History teaches us that anti-
hate speech laws regularly have been used to oppress racial and other 
minorities. For example, none of the anti-Semites who were responsible 
for arousing France against Captain Alfred Dreyfus were ever prosecuted 
for group libel. But Emile Zola was prosecuted for libeling the French 
clergy and military in his famous "J' accuse," and he had to flee to 
England to escape punishment. 140 Additionally, closer to home, the 
very doctrines that Lawrence invokes to justify regulating campus hate 
speech-for example, the fighting words doctrine, upon which he chiefly 
relies-have always been particularly threatening to the speech of racial 
and political minorities. 
That the foregoing examples simply illustrate a longstanding global 
pattern was documented in a 1992 book published by Article XIX, the 
London-based International Centre Against Censorship {which takes its 
name from the provision in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
that guarantees free speech), and the Human Rights Centre at the Uni-
versity of Essex in Great Britain. Drawing upon contemporary analyses 
of the experience in fourteen different countries, with various laws pun-
ishing racist and other hate speech, the book shows that such laws 
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consistently have been used to suppress expression by members of racial 
and other minority groups. Article XIX's legal director described this 
pattern: 
The flagrant abuse of laws which restrict hate speech by the authorities ... 
provides the most troubling indictment of such laws. Thus, the laws in Sri Lanka 
and South Africa have been used almost exclusively against the oppressed and 
politically weakest communities .... Selective or lax enforcement by the authori-
ties, including in the UK, Israel, and the former Soviet Union, allows govern-
ments to compromise the right of dissent and inevitably leads to disaffection and 
feelings of alienation among minority groups.141 
The general lesson that anti-hate speech laws will be used to punish 
members of groups that are relatively politically powerless and targets 
of discrimination has also proven true in the specific context of campus 
hate speech regulations. In 1974, in a move aimed at the National Front, 
the British National Union of Students (NUS) adopted a resolution that 
representatives of "openly racist and fascist organizations" were to be 
prevented from speaking on college campuses "by whatever means nec-
essary (including disruption of the meeting)." A substantial motivation 
for the rule had been to stem an increase in campus anti-Semitism. 
Ironically, however, following the United Nations' cue, some British 
students deemed Zionism a form of racism beyond the bounds of permit-
ted discussion. Accordingly, in 1975 British students invoked the NUS 
resolution to disrupt speeches by Israelis and Zionists, including the 
Israeli ambassador to England. The intended target of the NUS resolu-
tion, the National Front, applauded this result. However, the NUS itself 
became disenchanted by this and other unintended consequences of its 
resolution and repealed it in 1977. 
The British experience under its campus anti-hate speech rule parallels 
the experience in the United States under the first such rule that led to a 
judicial decision. During the year-and-a-half that the University of Mich-
igan rule was in effect, there were more than twenty cases of whites 
charging blacks with racist speech. More importantly, the only two 
instances in which the rule was invoked to sanction racist speech (as 
opposed to sexist and other forms of hate speech) involved the punish-
ment of speech by or on behalf of black srudents:142 Additionally, the 
only student who was subjected to a full-fledged disciplinary hearing 
under the Michigan rule was a black student accused of homophobic 
and sexist expression. In seeking clemency from the sanctions imposed 
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following this hearing, the student asserted that he had been singled out 
because of his race and his political views. Others who were punished 
for hate speech under the Michigan rule included several Jewish students 
accused of engaging in anti-Semitic expression 143 and an Asian-Ameri-
can student accused of making an anti-black comment. 144 Likewise, the 
student who brought a lawsuit {which was ultimately settled when the 
university agreed to abandon its policy in favor of a narrow one) chal-
lenging the University of Connecticut 's hate speech policy, under which 
she had been penalized for an allegedly homophobic remark, was Asian 
American. She claimed that, among the other students who had engaged 
in similar expression, she had been singled out for punishment because 
of her ethnic background. 
Lawrence himself recognizes that rules regulating racist speech might 
backfire and be invoked disproportionately against blacks and other 
traditionally oppressed groups. Indeed, he charges that other university 
rules already are used to silence anti-racist, but not racist, speakers.145 
Lawrence proposes to avoid this danger by excluding from the rule's 
protection "persons who were vilified on the basis of their membership 
in dominllnt majority groups." 146 Even putting aside the fatal First 
Amendment fJaws in such a radical departure from content- and view-
point-neutrality principles, the proposed exception would create far 
more problems of equality and enforceability than it would solve. 147 
A second reason why censorship of racist speech actually may subvert 
rather than promote the goal of eradicating racism is that such censor-
ship measures often have the effect of glorifying racist speakers. Efforts 
at suppression result in racist speakers' receiving attention and publicity 
that they otherwise would not have garnered. As previously noted, 
psychological studies reveal that whenever the government attempts to 
censor speech, the censored speech-for that very reason- becomes 
more appealing to many people. Still worse, when pitted against the 
government, racist speakers may appear as martyrs or even heroes. 
Advocates of hate speech regulations do not seem to realize that their 
own attempts to suppress speech increase public interest in the ideas 
they are trying to stamp out. Thus, Lawrence wrongly suggests that the 
ACLU's defense of hatemongers' free speech rights "makes heroes out of 
bigots"; in actuality, experience demonstrates that it is the attempt to 
suppress racist speech that has this effect, not the attempt to protect 
such speech.148 
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There is a third reason why laws that proscribe racist speech could 
well undermine goals of reducing bigotry. As Lawrence recognizes, given 
the overriding importance of free speech in our society, any speech 
regulation must be narrowly drafted. Therefore, it can affect only the 
most blatant, crudest forms of racism. The more subtle, and hence 
potentially more invidious, racist expressions will survive. Virtually all 
would agree that no law could possibly eliminate all racist speech, let 
alone racism itself. If the marketplace of ideas cannot be trusted to 
winnow out the hateful, then there is no reason to believe that censor-
ship wiJI do so. The most it could possibly achieve would be to drive 
some racist thought and expression underground, where it would be 
more difficult to respond to such speech a~d the underlying attitudes it 
expresses. The British experience confirms this prediction. 
The positive effect of racist speech-in terms of making society aware 
of and mobilizing its opposition to the evils of racism- are illustrated 
by the wave of campus racist incidents now under discussion. Ugly and 
abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtedly have had the 
beneficial result of raising public consciousness about the underlying 
societal problem of racism. If these expressions had been chilled by 
virtue of university sanctions, then it is doubtful that there would be 
such widespread discussion on campuses, let alone more generally, about 
the real problem of racism. Consequently, society would be less mobi-
lized to attack this problem. Past experience confirms that the public 
airing of racist and other forms of hate speech catalyzes communal 
efforts to redress the bigotry that underlies such expression and to stave 
off any discriminatory conduct that might follow from it.149 
Banning racist speech could well undermine the goal of combating 
racism for additional reasons. Some black scholars and activists main-
tain that an anti-racist speech policy may perpetuate a paternalistic view 
of minority groups, suggesting that they are incapable of defending 
themselves against biased expressions. Additionally, hate speech restric-
tions stultify the candid intergroup dialogue that is an essential precondi-
tion for reducing discrimination. Education, free discussion, and the 
airing of misunderstandings and failures of sensitivity are more likely to 
promote positive intergroup relations than are legal battles. The rules 
barring hate speech will continue to generate litigation and other forms 
of controversy that will exacerbate intergroup tensions. Moreover, hate 
speech rules could well fuel resentment against the minority group mem-
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bers who are likely to be perceived as the proponents or intended bene-
ficiaries of such rules. Finally, the censorship approach is diversionary. 
It makes it easier for communities to avoid coming to grips with less 
convenient and more expensive, but ultimately more meaningful, ap-
proaches for combating discrimination. 
5. MEANS CONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
CAN PROMOTE RACIAL EQUALITY MORE EFFECTIVELY 
THAN CAN CENSORSHIP 
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the time-honored principle that 
the appropriate response to speech conveying ideas that we reject or find 
offensive is not to censor such speech, but rather to exercise our own 
speech rights. In Texas v. Johnson, 150 the Court urged this count-
erspeech strategy upon the many Americans who are deeply offended by 
the burning of their country's flag: "The way to preserve the flag's 
special role is not to punish those who feel differently about these 
matters. It is to persuade them that they are wrong." 151 In addition to 
persuasion, the types of private expressive conduct that could be invoked 
in response to racist speech include censure and boycotts. 
In the context of countering racism on campus, the strategy of in-
creasing speech-rather than decreasing it-not only would be consis-
tent with First Amendment principles, but also would be more effective 
in advancing equality goals. All government agencies and officers, in-
cluding state university officials, should condemn slavery, de jure segre-
gation, and other racist institutions and policies that the government 
formerly supported. State university and other government officials also 
should affirmatively endorse equality principles. Furthermore, these gov-
ernment representatives should condemn racist ideas expressed by pri-
vate speakers. 152 In the same vein, private individuals and groups should 
exercise their First Amendment rights by speaking out against racism. 
Traditional civil libertarians have exercised their own speech rights in 
this fashion and also have defended the First Amendment freedoms of 
others who have done so.153 
In addition to the preceding measures, which could be implemented 
on a society-wide basis, other measures would be especially suited to 
the academic setting. (The ACLU policy on campus hate speech urges 
universities to take various suggested steps to counter racism and other 
230 Nadine Strossen 
forms of discrimination, consistent with free speech and equality values. 
See Appendix.) First, universities should encourage members of their 
communities voluntarily to restrain the form (but not the substance) of 
their expression in light of the feelings and concerns of various minority 
groups. Universities could facilitate voluntary self-restraint by providing 
training in communications, information about diverse cultural perspec-
tives, and other education designed to promote intergroup understand-
ing. Members of both minority and majority groups should be encour-
aged to be mutually respectful. Individuals who violate these norms of 
civility should not be subject to any disciplinary or mandatory action, 
but instead should be offered education, information, and advice on a 
voluntary basis. Of course, universities must vigilantly ensure that even 
voluntary limits on the manner of academic discourse do not chill its 
content. 
In addition to the foregoing measures, universities also should create 
forums in which controversial race-related issues and ideas could be 
discussed in a candid but constructive way. Further, universities could 
encourage students to receive education in the history of racism and the 
civil rights movement in the United States and be exposed to the culture 
and traditions of racial and ethnic groups other than their own. Consis-
tent with free speech tenets, these courses must allow all faculty and 
students to express their own views and must not degenerate into "reed-
ucation camps." 
The proposed measures for eliminating racism on campus are consis-
tent not only with American constitutional norms of free speech and 
equality, but also with internationally recognized human rights. For 
example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides, in Article 
26(2), that individuals have a right to receive, and states have an obliga-
tion to provide, education which "promote[s] understanding, tolerance 
and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups." 
Many universities appear to be responding constructively to the re-
cent upsurge in campus hate speech incidents by adopting some of the 
measures suggested here. This development demonstrates the positive 
impact of racist speech, in terms of galvanizing community efforts to 
counter the underlying attitudes it expresses. 
It is particularly important to devise anti-racism strategies consistent 
with the First Amendment because racial and other minority groups 
ultimately have far more to lose than to gain through a weakened free 
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speech guarantee. History has demonstrated that minorities have been 
among the chief beneficiaries o f a vigorous free speech safeguard. In his 
1994 book, Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy, 
Samuel Walker shows that, throughout the twentieth century, the equal-
ity rights of African Americans and other minority groups were depen-
dent on a robust free speech concept. He further shows that, realizing the 
importance of protecting even speech viewed as hateful or dangerous-
because their own speech certainly was so viewed in many Southern and 
other communities-the major civil rights organizations consistently 
opposed efforts to restrict hate speech. As Walker concluded, " the ' les-
sons' of the civil rights movement were that the interests of racial minori-
ties and powerless groups were best protected through the broadest, 
most content-neutral protection of speech." 154 
Lawrence offers two rebuttals to the proposition that blacks are (on 
balance) benefited rather than hurt by a strong free speech guarantee. 
First, he notes that "[t]he first amendment coexisted with slavery." 155 It 
is undeniable that, until the Union won the Civil War, not only the First 
Amendment, but also all of the Constitution's provisions guaranteeing 
liberty, coexisted with the total negation of liberty through the institu-
tion of slavery. It is also true, however, that the free speech guarantees 
of the federal Constitution and some state constitutions allowed aboli-
tionists to advocate the end of slavery. Moreover, it must be recalled 
that until the 1930s, the First Amendment provided no protection what-
soever against speech or press restrictions enacted by state or local 
governments. Further, although the First Amendment from its adoption 
provided theoretical protection against actions by the national govern-
ment, in practice it was not enforced judicially until the latter half of the 
twentieth century. Not until 1965 did the Supreme Court init ially exer-
cise its power to invalidate unconstitutional congressional statutes, 
which it had recognized 162 years earlier, in the First Amendment 
context. 156 Thus, under the Espionage Act of 1918 and similar state 
statutes, numerous individuals were punished for expressing unpopular 
political opinions. During World War I and its aftermath, the First 
Amendment did not prevent these laws from contributing to "the gravest 
period of political repression in American history." 157 
In short, although slavery coexisted with the theoretical guarantees 
enunciated in the First Amendment, slavery did not coexist with the 
judicially enforceable version of those guarantees that emerged only 
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after World War I. We never can know how much more quickly and 
peacefully the anti-slavery forces might have prevailed if free speech and 
press, as well as other rights, had been judiciaJly protected against 
violations by all levels of government earlier in our history. That robust 
freedoms of speech and press ultimately might have threatened slavery is 
suggested by southern states' passage of laws limiting these freedoms in 
an effort to undermine the abolitionist cause. 
The second basis for Lawrence's lack of "faith in free speech as the 
most important vehicle for liberation" 158 is the notion that "equality 
[is] a precondition to free speech." 159 Lawrence maintains that racism 
devalues the ideas of non-whites and of anti-racism in the marketplace 
of ideas. Like the economic market, the ideological market sometimes 
works to improve society, but not always.160 Odious ideas, such as 
the idea of black inferiority, will not necessarily be driven from the 
marketplace. Therefore, the marketplace rationale alone might not jus-
tify free speech for racist thoughts. But that rationale does not stand 
alone. 
The civil libertarian and judicial defense of racist speech also is based 
on the knowledge that censors have stifled the voices of oppressed 
persons and groups far more often than those of their oppressors. Cen-
sorship traditionally has been the tool of people who seek to subordinate 
minorities, not those who seek to liberate them. As Harry Kalven has 
shown, the civil rights movement of the 1960s depended on free speech 
principles. 161 These principles allowed protestors to carry their messages 
to audiences who found such messages highly offensive and threatening 
to their most deeply cherished views of themselves and their way of 
life. Equating civil rights activists with Communists, subversives, and 
criminals, government officials mounted inquisitions against the 
NAACP, seeking compulsory disclosure of its membership lists and 
endangering the members' jobs and lives. Only strong principles of free 
speech and association could-and did-protect the drive for desegre-
gation. Martin Luther King, Jr., wrote his historic letter from a Bir-
mingham jail, 162 but the Birmingham parade ordinance that King and 
other demonstrators had violated eventually was declared an unconstitu-
tional invasion of their free speech rights.163 Moreover, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which these demonstrators championed, did become law. 
The more disruptive forms of protest, which Lawrence credits with 
having been more effective-such as marches, sit-ins, and kneel-ins-
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were especially dependent on generous judicial constructions of the free 
speech guarantee.164 Notably, many of these protective interpretations 
initially had been formulated in cases brought on behalf of anti-civil 
rights demonstrators. Similarly, the insulting and often racist language 
that more militant black activists hurled at police officers and other 
government officials also was protected under the same principles and 
precedents.165 
The foregoing history does not prove conclusively that free speech 
is an essential precondition for equality, as some respected political 
philosophers have argued. But it does belie Lawrence's theory that 
equality is an essential precondition for free speech. Moreover, this 
history demonstrates the symbiotic interrelationship between free speech 
and equality, which parallels the relationship between civil liberties and 
civil rights more generally. Both sets of aims must be pursued simultane-
ously because the pursuit of each aids the realization of the other. The 
mutual interdependence of equality and liberty was forcefully described 
by Kenneth Karst: 
[T]he constitutional values of equality and liberty are fundamentaUy linked by 
the notion that equal access to certain institutions and services is a prime 
component of any meaningful liberty. This link is reflected in the language of 
egalitarian movements. The civil rights movement of the 1960s, for example, 
marched under the banner of "Freedom" even though its chief objective was 
equal access-to the vote, to education, to housing, even to lunch counters. 
"Liberation" is today a theme of more than rhetorical significance in egalitarian 
causes such as the women's movement. 166 
CONCLUSION 
Some traditional civil libertarians may agree with Lawrence that a uni-
versity rule banning a narrowly defined class of assaultive, harassing 
racist expression might comport with First Amendment principles and 
make a symbolic contribution to the racial equality mandated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. However, Lawrence and other members of 
the academic community who advocate such steps must recognize that 
educators have a special responsibility to avoid the danger posed by 
focusing on symbols that obscure the real underlying issues. 
The recent exploitation of the American flag as a symbol of patrio-
tism, to distort the true nature of that concept, serves as a sobering 
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reminder of this risk. Joseph S. Murphy, chancellor of The City Univer-
sity of New York, recently offered lessons for educators from the flag-
related controversies. His cautionary words apply even more powerfully 
to the campus hate speech controversy, since the general responsibility 
of academics to call for an honest and direct discourse about compelling 
societal problems is especially great within our own communities: 
As educators, we should be somewhat concerned [about the manipulation of 
such symbols as the flag for partisan political purposes]. At our best, we convey 
ideas in their full complexity, with ample appreciation of the ambiguity that 
attaches to most important concepts. We use symbols, but we do so to illumi-
nate, not to obscure .... The real question is how we use our position in the 
university and in society to steer national discourse away from an obsessive 
fixation on the trivial representation of ideas, and toward a proper focus on the 
underlying conflicts that define our era. 167 
An exaggerated concern with racist speech creates a risk of elevating 
symbols over substance in two problematic respects. First, it may well 
divert our attention from the causes of racism to its symptoms. Second, 
a focus on the hateful message conveyed by particular speech could 
likely distort our view of fundamental neutral principles applicable to 
our system of free expression generally. We should not let the racist 
veneer in which expression is cloaked obscure our recognition of how 
important free expression is and of how effectively it has advanced 
racial equality. 
Appendix 
ACLU Policy Statement: Free Speech and Bias on College Campuses 
(adopted by the ACLU National Board of Directors, without dissent, 
on October 13, 1990) 
PREAMBLE 
The significant increase in reported incidents of racism and other forms 
of bias at colleges and universities is a matter of profound concern to the 
ACLU. Some have proposed that racism, sexism, homophobia and other 
such biases on campus must be addr;-essed in whole or in part by restric-
tions on speech. The alternative to such restrictions, it is said, is to 
permit such bias to go unremedied and to subject the targets of such bias 
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to a loss of equal educational opportunity. The ACLU rejects both these 
alternatives and reaffirms its traditional and unequivocal commitment 
both to free speech and to equal opportunity. 
POLICY 
r. Freedom of thought and expression are indispensable to the pursuit 
of knowledge and the dialogue and dispute that characterize meaningful 
education. AJI members of the academic community have the right to 
hold and to express views that others may find repugnant, offensive, or 
emotionally distressing. The ACLU opposes all campus regulations 
which interfere with the freedom of professors, students and administra-
tors to teach, learn, discuss and debate or to express ideas, opinions or 
feelings in classroom, public or private discourse. 
2. The ACLU has opposed and will continue to oppose and challenge 
disciplinary codes that reach beyond permissible boundaries into the 
realm of protected speech, even when those codes are directed at the 
problem of bias on campus. 
3. This policy does not prohibit colleges and universities from en-
acting disciplinary codes aimed at restricting acts of harassment, intimi-
dation and invasion of privacy. Although "harassment," "intimidation," 
and " invasion of privacy" are imprecise terms susceptible of irnpermissi-
bly overbroad application, each term defines a type of conduct which is 
legally proscribed in many jurisdictions when directed at a specific indi-
vidual or individuals and when intended to frighten, coerce, or unrea-
sonably harry or intrude upon its target. Threatening telephone calls to a 
minority student's dormitory room, for example, would be proscribable 
conduct under the terms of this policy. Expressive behavior which has no 
other effect than to create an unpleasant learning environment, however, 
would not be the proper subject of regulation. The fact that words 
may be used in connection with otherwise actionable conduct does 
not immunize such conduct from appropriate regulation. For example, 
intimidating phone calls, threats of attack, extortion and blackmail are 
unprotected forms of conduct which include an element of verbal or 
written expression. As always, however, great care must be taken to 
avoid applying such provisions [that proscribe harassment and similar 
conduct] overbroadly to protected expression. The ACLU will continue 
to review such college codes and their application in specific situations 
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on a case-by-case basis . ... In determining whether a university disci-
plinary code impermissibly restricts protected speech, there must be a 
searching analysis both of the language of the code and the manner in 
which it is applied. Many factors, which are heavily fact-oriented, must 
be considered, including time, place, pattern of conduct and, where 
relevant, the existence of an authority relationship between speaker 
and target. 
4. All students have the right to participate fully in the educational 
process on a nondiscriminatory basis. Colleges and universities have an 
affirmative obligation to combat racism, sexism, homophobia, and other 
forms of bias, and a responsibility to provide equal opportunities 
through education. To address these responsibilities and obligations, the 
ACLU advocates the following actions by colleges and universities: 
(a) to utilize every opportunity to communicate through its administra-
tors, faculty, and students its commitment to the elimination of all 
forms of bigotry on campus; 
(b) to develop comprehensive plans aimed at reducing prejudice, re-
sponding promptly to incidents of bigotry and discriminatory ha-
rassment, and protecting students from any such further incidents; 
(c) to pursue vigorously efforts to attract enough minorities, women 
and members of other historically disadvantaged groups as students, 
faculty members and administrators to alleviate isolation and to 
ensure real integration and diversity in academic life; 
(d) to offer and consider whether to require all students to take courses 
in the history and meaning of prejudice, including racism, sexism, 
and other forms of invidious discrimination (see ACLU Policy #60, 
which states: "In the classroom, a teacher should promote an atmo-
sphere of free inquiry. This should include discussion of controver-
sial issues without the assumption that they are settled in advance 
or that there is only one 'right' answer in matters of dispute. Such 
discussion should include presentation of divergent opinions and 
doctrines, past and present, on a given subject."); 
(e) to establish new-student orientation programs and continuing coun-
seling programs that enable students of different races, sexes, reli-
gions, and sexual orientations to learn to live with each other out-
side the classroom; 
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(f) to review and, where appropriate, revise course offerings as well as 
extracurricular programs in order to recognize the contributions of 
those whose art, music, literature and learning have been insuffi-
ciently reflected in the curriculum of many American colleges and 
universities; 
(g) to address the question of de facto segregation in dormitories and 
other university facilities; and 
(h) to take such other steps as are consistent with the goal of ensuring 
that all students have an equal opportunity to do their best work 
and to participate fully in campus life. 
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r. There is no single "civil libertarian" or ACLU position on many of the 
issues discussed in this article. For example, both Lawrence and Strossen are 
avowed civil libertarians and ACLU supporters, although they disagree on 
certain civil liberties issues. 
On October 13, 1990, the ACLU's National Board of Directors adopted 
a policy opposing campus disciplinary codes against hate speech. For the 
text of this policy, which was adopted without dissent, see the Appendix. 
In addition to the national organization, the ACLU includes fifty-one 
statewide or regional "affiliates," alJ of which may adopt their own policies. 
Although an affiliate's policies must be " in accordance" with those of the 
national organization, this requirement is designed "to obtain general unity, 
rather than absolute uniformity." See Policy Guide of the American Civil 
Liberties Union, at Policy No. 501 (rev. ed. 1990) (hereafter ACLU Policy 
Guide). Accordingly, some ACLU affiliates may adopt policies concerning 
the regulation of campus hate speech that are to some extent divergent from 
each other, and from the national ACLU policy. 
To reflect the fact that civil libertarians may differ about some specific 
issues discussed in this chapter, the term "traditional civil libertarian" is 
used only to describe the general view that much hate speech is entitled to 
First Amendment protection. All other, more specific, views expressed in 
this article reflect the author's opinions. 
2. Dambrot v. Central Michigan University, 839 F.Supp. 477 (E.D. Mich. 
1993); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin 
System, 774 F.Supp. n63 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. University of Michigan, 
721 F.Supp. 8 52 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Likewise, in a fourth legal challenge to 
another campus hate speech code, the university agreed to rewrite its code 
to bring it into conformity with the First Amendment. Wu v. University 
of Connecticut, No. Civ. H-89-649 PCD (D. Conn. 1990). The ACLU 
represented the parties that successfully challenged the hate speech codes in 
all these cases except Dambrot. 
3. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, n2 S.Ct. 2538 (1992). 
4. See Lawrence at 481. 
5. In Lawrence's composite view, traditional civil libertarians display the fol-
lowing "typical" propensities. They argue that all speech should be abso-
lutely protected (see Lawrence at 436, 438, 449, 457, 461, 473-74, 476-
77), at least if it "stops short of physical violence" (id. at 449). They 
maintain that no face-to-face insults or fighting words are protected free 
speech, unless they are racial in nature (see id. at 436-37, 476). They might 
support "less protection" for captive audiences "when they are held captive 
by racist speakers" (id. at 438). They do not acknowledge that racist speech 
inflicts real harm (see id. at 448, 457, 458, 478). They are more committed 
to the values reflected in the Constitution's free speech clause than to those 
reflected in its equal protection clause (see id. at 448, 461, 477-78). They 
do not support, and indeed "often" oppose, "group expressions of condem-
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nation" of racist speech (see id. at 477). They "typically ... elect[ ) to 
stand by" while universities draft constitutionally vulnerable hate speech 
regulations (see id. at 477). They "wait [to) attack [such] poorly drafted and 
obviously overbroad regulations" (id. at 478 n.162). 
The foregoing stereotypes are presented through unsupported assertions 
and are belied by the facts recited throughout this chapter. Lawrence also 
makes incorrect and misleading statements specifically about the ACLU and 
its members, which are also countered throughout this chapter. See id. at 
473, 478 & nn.163-64. 
Lawrence qualifies his depiction of the "traditional" civil libertarian or 
ACLU member in one important respect: he repeatedly suggests that civil 
libertarians and ACLU members who are members of minority groups (or 
perhaps women) differ from others in their positions on free speech and 
equal protection issues. See id. at 466 (distinguishing "[m]ost blacks" from 
"many white civil libertarians"); see also id. at 458-59, 461 & n.u3, 473-
74, 477-78 & nn.163-64. 
Such racial (and gender) stereotyping is both factually inaccurate and 
antithetical to equality principles. The inaccuracy is illustrated by the fact 
that the ACLU's policy concerning free speech and equality on campus (see 
Appendix) was adopted unanimously, without dissent from any of the many 
National Board members who are African American, members of other 
minority groups, or female. 
6. See Lawrence, at 450 & n.82., 481, citing Stanford University, "Fundamen-
tal Stanford Interpretation: Free Expression and Discriminatory Harass-
ment" (June 1990). At various points in his article, Lawrence endorses 
regulations of broader scope. However, he stresses his proposed variation 
of the Stanford code, which would apply to "all common areas" and would 
"not ... protect[ ) persons . . . vilified on the basis of their membership in 
dominant majority groups." Lawrence at 450 n.82. Therefore, throughout 
the remainder of this chapter, references to the regulation endorsed by 
Professor Lawrence refer to this formulation, unless expressly indicated oth-
erwise. 
7. See Lawrence at 438-49. 
8. See id. at 449. 
9. Id. at 436 n.27. 
10. Thomas Grey, who drafted the Stanford code, said "his rule probably 
wouldn't apply to one of the most publicized racial incidents at Stanford, 
when a white student left on a black student's door a poster of Beethoven 
drawn as a black caricature." Gottlieb, "Banning Bigoted Speech: Stanford 
Weighs Rules," San Jose Mercury-News, Jan. 7, 1990, at 3, col. 1. The 
broader variation of the Stanford code that Lawrence endorsed (see Law-
rence at 450 n.82.) apparently would have applied to this Stanford incident 
(see id. at 456 n.101), but not to the incident endured by his sister or to his 
boyhood ordeal. 
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11. Lawrence at 480. 
12.. I owe this formulation to Ira Glasser, executive director of the ACLU (and 
a non-lawyer). 
13. Id. at 449. See also id. at 438,457, 461, 473-74, 476-77. 
14. See T. Emerson, The System of Free Expression, 337-38 (1970) (" '[F]ight-
ing words' can be considered the equivalent of knocking a chip off the 
shoulder-the traditional symbolic act that puts the parties in the role of 
physical combatants."); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 12.-10, 
at 852.-53 (2.d ed., 1988) ("[l)t is not difficult to recognize the genuine 
dilemma that law enforcement officers may confront when violence is incipi-
ent; although free speech would be suppressed, silencing the speaker is 
certainly preferable to a blood bath"). 
15. See, e.g., F. Haiman, Speech and Law in a Free Society (1981). Haiman 
states: 
[l]t is my contention that in all of the circumstances in which antagonistic crowds or 
individuals respond or threaten to respond violently to communicators, the audience 
should be held responsible for its behavior, and not the speaker .... [V]iolent reac-
tion, by definition, is born in the psyche of the respondent. The idea to attack the 
communicator is not implanted or urged by the speaker, as might an idea to commit 
illegal acts be initiated and advocated by one who incites a supportive audience ... . 
. . . [l]f hostile audiences are not held responsible for their own behavior ... they 
will soon learn that they have the power to exercise a "heckler's veto" over the speech 
of their antagonists. 
Id. at 2.58; see also id. at 2.0-2.3, 132.-35, 2.53-54, 2.56-58. 
16. For example, the Stanford code applies only to intentionally insulting words 
"addressed directly" to an individual or small number of individuals. In 
contrast, the University of Michigan rule, which was held to violate the First 
Amendment, did not require either that the penalized words be intentionally 
insulting or that they be addressed to specific individuals. Moreover, the 
Michigan rule originally proscribed speech that "(c)reates an intimidating, 
hostile, or demeaning environment." The same overbroad, vague language 
was contained in the University of Wisconsin rule, which was also held 
unconstitutional. 
17. The reference is to an American neo-Nazi group's efforts, in 1977-78, to 
gain permission to demonstrate peacefully in Skokie, Illinois, a community 
with a large Jewish population, including many Holocaust survivors. For 
the judicial opinions rejecting arguments that Skokie residents should be 
protected from such personally odious expressions, see Collin v. Smith, 578 
F.2.d 1197, 12.05-7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of 
Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 69 ILi. 2.d 605, 612.-18, 373 N.E. 2.d 2.1, 
2.3-2.5 (1978). For an excellent account of both the specific Skokie contro-
versy and the general issues it raised, see A. Neier, Defending My Enemy: 
American Nazis, the Skokie Case, and the Risks of Freedom (1979). 
18. I use the term "minorities" to encompass groups differentiated by various 
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characteristics, including race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and 
physical disability. I recognize, however, that the term "minorities" may 
"impl[y] a certain delegitimacy in a majoritarian system" and in fact de-
scribes groups that in the aggregate are a majority. WiUiams, "Alchemical 
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstrucred Rights," 22 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 401, 404 n.4 (1987). 
19. See C. Lawrence, "Presentation at ACLU Biennial Conference," at 7. 
20. Dorsen, " Is There a Right to Stop Offensive Speech? The Case of the Nazis 
in Skokie," in Civil Liberties in Conflict, 133-34 (L. Gostin, ed., 1988). 
21. Regarding speech that is an essential element of unlawful conduct, the 
ACLU Policy Guide, at Policy No. 16, states that "[T]here is . . . [a] need 
for the regulation of selling practices to minimize fraud, deception, and 
misinterpretation . . .. If the sale or transaction is one that can be validly 
regulated or prohibited, then communications that are an integral part of 
such a sale or transaction can be regulated." 
Regarding speech that can cause an immediate injury by its very utter-
ance, see ACLU Policy Guide, at Policy No. 6 (accepting limitations on 
expression that creates "clear and present danger" of immediate unlawful 
action); id. at Policy No. 37 (recognizing that, under strictly limited circum-
stances, certain lawsuits may be brought for libel and invasion of privacy 
through speech without violating First Amendment). 
Regarding captive audiences, the ACLU Policy Guide, at Policy No. 
43, states: 
[Tjhe First Amendment is not inconsistent with reasonable regulations designed to 
restrict sensory intrusions so intense as to be assaultive. Reasonable regulations are 
those that apply only to time, place and manner without regard to content .... What 
constitutes a "reasonable" regulation will necessarily vary depending upon such 
factors as (1) the size of the ... area involved, (2.) the duration [or] frequency with 
which an individual is in the area ... , or (3) the extent to which alternatives exist so 
that the individual can reasonably be called upon to avoid the area .... Assaultive 
sensory intrusions are those that are objectionable to the average person because 
of an excessive degree of intensity, e.g., volume or brightness, and which cannot 
be avoided. 
In larger public spaces ... all communication is permitted unless it interferes with 
the primary purpose of the space .... 
In open public areas .. . people are able to move away from communication 
which they consider offensive. So long as there is ample public space[ ] where 
communication is unrestricted, the government may creat [sic] and maintain reason-
ably limited sanctuaries in public places where people can go for quiet contempla-
tion. 
22. L. Tribe, S 12-19, at 949-50 n.24. For an argument that the captive 
audience concept should be construed narrowly, see Haiman, "Speech v. 
Privacy: Is There a Right Not to Be Spoken To?," 67 Nw. U.L. Rev. 153, 
184 (1972). Haiman argues: 
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[H]uman beings have a significant ability mentally to reject many assaultive stimuli. 
The process known as "selective perception" enables us to generally choose what we 
wish to assimilate from the multitude of sensory bombardments surrounding us .... 
[W]e also have a strong tendency to screen out or distort messages that are inconsis• 
tent with ... our current beliefs. 
Given these tendencies ... one might argue that the possibilities of unwelcome 
messages penetrating the psychological armor of unwilling audiences are so small 
that we ought to be worrying more about how to help unpopular communicators get 
through to reluctant listeners than how to give further protection from speech to 
those who already know too well how to isolate themselves from alien ideas. 
23. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970). 
24. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975); Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). 
25. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. 
26. See, e.g., Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 
(1949). 
27. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 
(1980). 
28. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967); Shelton 
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,487 (1960); Sweeney v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 
234, 250 (1957). 
29. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 803 
(1985). 
30. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 420 (1971); see 
also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,485 (1988). 
31. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989). The district court in the 
same case had characterized these dormitories as "limited public forums." 
Fox v. Board of Trustees, 649 F.Supp. 1393, 1401 (N.D.N.Y. 1986). 
32. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
33. See Schmidt, "Freedom of Thought: A Principle in Peril?," Yale Alumni 
Mag., Oct. 1989, at 66 ("On some other campuses in this country, values 
of civility and community have been offered by some as paramount values 
of the university, even to the point of superseding freedom of expression. 
Such a view is wrong in principle, and, if extended, disastrous to freedom 
of t~ought"). 
34. Joseph Grano stated: 
One of the harms posited in the University of Michigan case was that some students 
found the speech at issue so upsetting that they had difficulty concentrating on their 
studies. The same harm could be posited, of course, in many other circumstances. 
During the Vietnam War, for example, the frequent and often caustic antiwar pro• 
tests, which sometimes even expressed support for those whom the United States was 
fighting, may have extremely upset students who had served in the battle, who had 
lost family members or friends in the war, or who simply believed that an unwavering 
loyalty was owed co their country. Similarly, many students, especially on segregated 
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campuses in the South, may have been deeply disturbed by the civil rights protests 
gripping the nation and many universities during the Sixties. 
Grano, "Free Speech v. the University of Michigan," Academic Questions, 
Spring 1990, at 17. 
35. See, e.g., Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735,741, 565 
P.2d Il73, 1176 (1977). 
The ACLU's policy endorsing restrictions on a limited category of verbal 
sexual harassment on campus is confined to situations that involve "the 
abuse of power." 
36. See First Nat') Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978); Madison Joint 
School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 
167, 175-76 (1976). 
37. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 305 (1974); American 
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323,333 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 
U.S. 1001 (1986). 
38. Lawrence at 450 n.82. 
39. See Hentoff, "Stanford and the Speech Police," Washington Post, July 21, 
1990, at A19, col. 1. Hentoff stated: 
During a debate in the Faculty Senate, Professor Michael Bratman offered a hypothet-
ical: in angry exchange with a white student, a black student calls him a "honky 
SOB." I assume, said Bratrnan, that language would be prohibited. 
"No," said Professor [Robert] Rabin [a law professor who chairs the Student 
Conduct Legislative Council, which propounded the code]. The proposed speech 
standard takes the position, Rabin explained, that the white majority as a whole is 
not in as much need of protection from discriminatory harassing speech as are those 
who have suffered discrimination. 
"Calling a white a 'honky,' " Rabin said, "is not the same as calling a black 
a 'nigger.," 
40. The University of Michigan based its rule on yet another approach, which 
focused on stigmatization and victimization of students, interference with 
academic efforts, and the creation of an intimidating or hostile educational 
environment. In Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F.Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 
1989), this rule was held to violate the First Amendment. 
41. 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992). 
42. Id. at 323. 
43. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
44. 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972) (where appellant had said to police officers, 
"White son of a bitch, I'll kill you," "You son of a bitch, I'll choke you to 
death," and " You son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again, 
I'll cut you all in pieces," Court reversed conviction under law that it found 
overbroad in light of Chaplinsky). 
45. See, e.g., Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924 (1974); Rosen v. 
California, 416 U.S. 924 (1974); Kelly v. Ohio, 416 U.S. 923 (1974); Lucas 
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v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 
(1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New 
Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972). 
46. See, e.g., Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 699 (1974) (per curiam); 
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 104, 109 (1973) (per curiam). 
47. Compare Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 
(1943) (use of word "fascist" is "part of the conventional give-and-take in 
our economic and political controversies" and hence protected under federal 
labor law) with Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573-74 (conviction affirmed on 
ground that words "God damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist," when 
addressed to police officer, were likely to provoke violent response). 
48. See, e.g., Gard, "Fighting Words as Free Speech," 58 Wash. U. L.Q. 531, 
536 (1980) (hereafter Gard) (post-Chaplinsky Supreme Court decisions 
have rendered fighting words doctrine "nothing more than a quaint remnant 
of an earlier morality that has no place in a democratic society dedicated to 
the principle of free expression"); Shea," 'Don't Bother to Smile When You 
Call Me That'-Fighting Words and the First Amendment," 63 Ky. L.]. I, 
1-2 (1975) ("majority of the U.S. Supreme Court has gradually concluded 
that fighting words, no matter how narrowly defined, are a protected form 
of speech"). 
49. See Gard at 580. 
50. H. Kalven, The Negro and the First Amendment, 14-15 (1965). 
51. Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, 151-52 (1941), at 151. 
52. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. III (1969); Cox v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 536,550 (1965); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I (1949). 
53. Gard at 580. 
54. Id. at 548. Accord id. at 568. Compare Lawrence, at 437 n.29 ("[T]here is 
no evidence that the continued usage of [the fighting words doctrine] has 
led down the slippery slope to rampant censorship"). 
55. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (state court 
upheld conviction on basis of fighting words doctrine in situation in which 
police officer said to young suspect's mother, "[g]et your black ass in the 
goddamned car," and she responded, "you god damn mother fucking po-
lice-I am going to [the Superintendent of Police] about this"); Street v. 
New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (black man who protested against shooting 
of civil rights leader James Meredith by burning the American flag and 
saying, " If they let that happen to Meredith we don't need an American 
flag," was convicted under statute that criminalized words casting contempt 
on United States flag; Supreme Court rejected contention that conviction 
could be justified on fighting words rationale, id. at 592); Edwards v. South 
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963) (state court upheld convictions of civil 
rights demonstrators for holding placards stating "I am proud to be a 
Negro" and "Down with Segregation"; Supreme Court rejected contention 
that convictions could be justified on fighting words doctrine); Waller v. 
City of St. Petersburg, 245 So. 2d 685 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), rev'd, City 
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of St. Petersburg v. Waller, 261 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1972) (black man was 
convicted after shouting "pig" at passing police car, and state supreme court 
upheld conviction based on fighting words doctrine). 
56. Lawrence at 453 n.92. 
57. See Gard at 22. 
58. Gard at 564. 
59. Lawrence recognizes the potential danger that any speech-restricting prece-
dent "would pose for the speech of all dissenters," and that such a danger 
"might ... include general societal tolerance for the suppression of speech." 
Lawrence at 458 & n.106. 
60. Gard at 578 (emphasis added). 
61. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
62. Falwell, 48 5 U.S. at 5 5. 
63. It is particularly noteworthy that David Riesman, who published an influ-
ential series of articles advocating group defamation laws in 1942, subse-
quently changed his position. See Riesman, "Democracy and Defamation: 
Fair Game and Fair Comment II," 42 Colum. L. Rev. 1282 (1942); Ries-
man, "Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment !," 42 
Colum. L. Rev. 1085 (1942); Riesman, "Democracy and Defamation: Con-
trol of Group Libel," 42 Co/um. L. Rev. 727 (1942). But see S. Walker, In 
Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU, at 330 n.23, 
437 (1990). 
64. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
65. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
66. IIO S.Ct. 2695 (1990). 
67. The Illinois statute provided, in pertinent part: " It shall be unlawful ... to 
. . . publish ... in any public place . . . any ... publication [which] .. . 
exposes citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision 
or obloquy." Ill. Rev. Stat., chap. 38, para. 471 (1949). Although the 
Supreme Court held this law constitutional in 1952, the Illinois legislature 
repealed it in 1961. 
68. Tanenhaus, "Group Libel," 35 Cornell L.Q. 261, 279-80 (1950). 
69. See Amsterdam, "Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment," 58 Minn. L. 
Rev. 349, 435 (1974) ("The dangers of abuse of a particular power are, 
certainly, a pertinent consideration in determining whether the power 
should be allowed in the first instance"). 
70. See L. Tribe,§ 12-10, at 856 (although the Constitution probably permits 
legislation punishing words that cause hurt by their mere utterance, such 
legislation "would be constitutionally problematic-the potential for con-
tent-specific regulation is always great"). 
71. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 
(1943); Boyd v. United States, u6 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). 
72. Walter Dellinger tellingly made this point about another proposed exception 
to the First Amendment of an ostensibly limited nature-for physical dese-
cration of the U.S. flag: 
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What would this proposed act of constitutional revision do to the moral legitimacy 
of the stance our Constitution has taken (and will continue to take) in defense of 
expression that offends many Americans as deeply as flag burning offends the great 
majority of us? ... Once we have quickly passed the Twenty-seventh amendment to 
protect the sensibilities of those who revere the flag, what do we say to those who are 
particularly offended by, but must continue to tolerate, the burning of crosses by 
hooded members of the Ku Klux Klan, a brazen reminder of the era of lynching and 
terror? And what do we say to those who find themselves silenced and marginalized 
by sexualized (but not constitutionally "obscene") portrayals of women? What endur• 
ing Constitutional principle will remain unimpaired that will legitimately surmount 
these claims ... ? 
"Hearings on Measures to Protect the Physical Integrity of the American 
Flag, Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary," 101st Cong., 1st sess. 
5 5 3 ( 1989) (statement of Walter Dellinger). 
73. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990) (footnote omitted}. 
74. As a private institution, Stanford University is not directly bound by First 
Amendment standards. However, many private academic institutions make 
policy choices to adhere to standards that are consistent with their notions 
of academic freedom. 
75. Gard at 563-64. 
76. The Stanford code also may fail to satisfy the Court's strict parameters for 
the fighting words doctrine in other respects. First, it does not expressly 
require that the prohibited speech "must constitute a personally abusive 
epithet," the first criterion set forth in Gard's list. Based on his analysis of 
cases that address the fighting words doctrine, Gard concluded that "the 
utterance must constitute an extremely provocative personal insult" in order 
to comport with free speech principles. Gard, at 5 3 6. 
Although the Stanford code may comply with the Court's second and 
third requirements, by prescribing that the prohibited speech must be "ad-
dressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or stigma-
tizes," both of these elements have been construed so strictly that they may 
not be satisfied by this provision. Some judicial rulings indicate that the 
second requirement, the face-to-face element, "is not satisfied by mere tech-
nical physical presence, but contemplates an extremely close physical prox-
imity." Gard, at 5 59. The third requirement has been interpreted to mean 
that "the offensive words must be descriptive of the particular person and 
addressed to that person." Gard, at 561 (emphasis added). The Stanford 
code does not require that the prohibited words describe the individual to 
whom they are addressed. Instead, under the Stanford code, the words may 
convey hatred for broad groups of people. 
77. That regulation provided that, in certain "[e]ducational and academic cen-
ters," individuals were subject to discipline for: 
Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the 
basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ances-
try, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status, and that ... 
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[i]nvolves an express or implied threat to ... or has the purpose or reasonably 
foreseeable effect of interfering with an individual's academic efforts, employ-
ment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal 
safety .... 
Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F.Supp. 852, 856 ( E.D. Mich. 1989). As 
originally adopted and implemented, the regulation also sanctioned speech 
that "[c]reates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for edu-
cational pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored ex-
tra-curricular activities." Id. After the regulation was legally challenged, 
however, the university announced that it was withdrawing that section on 
the ground that "a need exists for further explanation and clarification" of 
it. Id. 
Lawrence contends that it is unfair to judge the Stanford code in light of 
the experience under the Michigan rule, arguing that the latter was "clearly 
overbroad," and asserting that "it is difficult to believe that anyone at the 
University of Michigan Law School was consulted in drafting" it. Lawrence, 
at 477 n.161 & 478 n.162. 
It is ironic that, in this particular context, Lawrence seeks to focus the 
debate solely on the Stanford code. As previously observed, throughout his 
article he repeatedly defends alternative hate speech regulations that are not 
only broader than Stanford's but also broader than Michigan's. Moreover, 
his proffered rationales would justify sweeping prohibitions. Therefore, 
perhaps Lawrence should not be so quick to protest that the Michigan code 
was "obviously overbroad." Lawrence, at 478 n.162. 
In any event, the University of Michigan did consult with law school 
faculty members, including Lee Bollinger and Theodore St. Antoine, as 
well as university counsel and other lawyers. The university also received 
comments from numerous other individuals and groups, including the 
ACLU, in its drafting process. See Letter from Henry W. Saad (counsel to 
university in Doe litigation) to Honorable Avem Cohn, at 2 (Aug. 17, 
1989). Therefore, Lawrence's unsubstantiated assertion that the ACLU and 
"[t]raditional civil liberties lawyers typically have elected to stand by" while 
universities draft clearly unconstitutional rules (Lawrence at 477) is directly 
belied by the Michigan experience. 
78. 721 F.Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
79. See Doe, 721 F.Supp. 865. The court cited the following examples of 
protected speech that had been subjected to the policy: a statement by a 
graduate student in the School of Social Work, in a research class, express-
ing his belief that homosexuality was a disease and that he intended to 
develop a counseling plan for changing gay clients to straight (id.); the 
reading of an allegedly homophobic limerick, which ridiculed a well-known 
athlete for his presumed sexual orientation, by a student in the School of 
Business Administration during a class public-speaking exercise (id.); and a 
statement by a student during an orientation session of a preclinical den-
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tistry class, widely regarded as especially difficult, that he had heard that 
minorities had a hard time in the course and that they were not treated 
fairly (id. at 865-66). 
80. Lawrence at 478 n.162. 
81. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 
774 F.Supp. u63, u8o (E.D. Wis. 1991). 
82. Gottlieb, "Banning Bigoted Speech: Stanford Weighs Rules," San Jose Mer-
cury-News, Jan. 7, 1990, at 3, col. 1. 
83. Other examples of legitimate academic discourse condemned as "hare 
speech" include the following: a group of students complained that a faculty 
member had created a hostile atmosphere by quoting racist comments origi-
nally made at the turn of the century, even though the professor said that 
was not his intention (see Statement of the Washtenaw County Branch, 
American Civil Liberties Union on the University of Michigan Policy, "Dis-
crimination and Discriminatory Harassment by Students in the University 
Environment" 4, May 25, 1989); another group of students contended that 
the former students' complaint about the professor had itself created a 
hostile atmosphere (see id. at 5); a law student suggested that judicial 
decisions reflecting adverse stereotypes about blacks should not be studied 
in law school courses (see Shaw, "Caveat Emptor," N . Y.L. Sch. Rep., Apr. 
1989, at 3); a Jewish professor was penalized for suggesting to his black 
students that they should celebrate the anniversary of their ancestors' libera-
tion from slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment, just as Jews celebrate 
their ancestors' liberation from slavery during Passover (see Hentoff, "Cam-
pus Court-Martial," Washington Post, Dec. 15, 1988, at A25, col. 2; stu-
dents complained about a professor's statement that black students are not 
sufficiently critical of human rights violations by black African governments 
(see McKinley, "Minority Students Walk Out Over a Teacher's Remarks," 
New York Times, Oct. 4, 1989, at B3, col. 5). 
84. Regarding the chilling effect of a University of Connecticut anti-hate speech 
rule, which the ACLU successfully challenged, see Brief of Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 9-10 and n.10, 
Wu v. University of Conn., No. Civ. H-89-649 PCD (D. Conn. Jan. 25, 
1990) (submitted by ACLU). In its brief, the ACLU stated: 
[A] student could plausibly fear prosecution for voicing an opinion that members of 
the Unification Church ... are "cultists"; that Zionists are "imperialists" or that 
Palestinians are "terrorists"; that evangelical ministe.rs are "hustlers" and their fol-
lowers are "dupes"; or that homosexuals are "sick." .. . [A] homosexual rights 
activist could perhaps be prosecuted for declaring that Catholics are "bigots" if they 
follow their Church's teaching that homosexuality is a sin .... Similarly, a black 
activist student leader might reasonably hesitate to characterize other black students, 
who are deemed insufficiently supportive of black causes, as "Uncle Toms." 
85. As Justice Harlan observed in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971), 
"We cannot indulge in the facile assumption that one can forbid a particular 
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word without also running the substantial risk of suppressing ideas in 
the process." 
86. Affidavit of John Doe in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at para. 14, Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F.Supp. 8 52 (E.D. 
Mich. 1989) (No. 89-71683). 
87. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). See also West 
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there 
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion or other matters of opinion"). 
88. See Letter from William Cohen to George Parker, chair of the Student 
Conduct Legislative Council of Stanford University (March 10, 1989), 
reprinted in Stanford Univ. Campus Rep., Mar. 15, 1989, at 18. 
89. See Lawrence at 438-44. 
90. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,673 (1925) (Holmes,]., dissenting). 
91. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). 
92. Id. at 630-31. 
93· 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
94. Id. at 447. 
95. L. Tribe,§ 12-8, at 838 n.17. 
96. In a widely quoted dissent, Justice Holmes championed this rationale for 
free speech as "the theory of our Constitution": 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come 
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct 
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be 
carried out. 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
97. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24 ("[N]o other approach [than protecting free 
speech] would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice 
upon which our political system rests"). 
98. See L. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist 
Speech in American Society (1986). 
99. R. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society (1992). 
100. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (ACLU appeared amicus 
curiae). 
101. See Delgado, "Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, 
Epithets, and Name-Calling," 17 Harv. C.R. -C.L. L. Rev. 133, 179-
80 (1982): 
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[A]n epithet such as "You damn nigger" would almost always be found actionable, 
as it is highly insulting and highly racial. ... "Boy," directed at a young black male, 
might be actionable, depending on the speaker's intent, the hearer's understanding, 
and whether a reasonable person would consider it a racial insult in the particular 
context. "Hey, nigger," spoken affectionately between black persons and used as a 
greeting, would not be actionable. An insult such as "You dumb honkey," directed 
at a white person, could be actionable ... but only in the unusual situations where 
the plaintiff would suffer harm from such an insult. 
Id. See also UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin System, 774 F.Supp. 1163, n8o (E.D. Wis. 1991): 
[T]he Unive.rsity of Wisconsin-Whitewater found that a white student had not 
violated the UW Rule where he called a black student "nigger" as part of a verbal 
exchange which led to a physical confrontation .... The University explained that 
there was no violation because: "[The white student] was raised in a racially mixed 
neighborhood in Chicago. It was common for both blacks and whites in this 
environment to refer to blacks who were not respected, liked or appreciated as 
'nigger.' As [the white student] stated, 'it's like calling someone an ass or names like 
that.' [The black student] agreed and stated that this kind of language/name calling 
exists in his neighborhood as well. [He] also stated that he did not think [the] intent 
[of the white student] was to demean him personally or racially." 
102.. For example, during a discussion about the University of Wisconsin hate 
speech policy, even its advocates disagreed as to whether it would (or 
should) apply to the following hypothetical situation: A white student sits 
down next to a black student and says, "I want you to know that I'm a 
racist and hate the idea of blacks being here at the University," but does 
not use any racist epithet. Telephone interview with Eunice Edgar, execu-
tive director of ACLU of Wisconsin (Nov. 14, 1989). 
103. See Lawrence at 460. It should be stressed, though, that this expression 
would not be encompassed by either the Stanford code or Professor Law-
rence's variation on it. 
104. See letter from Gerald Gunther to George Parker, chair of the Student 
Conduct Legislative Council, Stanford University (Mar. 10, 1989), re-
printed in Stanford Univ. Campus Rep., Mar. 15, 1989, at 17 (hereafter 
Gunther letter): 
[L)est' it be said that I unduly slight the pain imposed by expressions of racial or 
religious hatred let me add that I have suffered that pain. I empathize with others 
who have, and I rest my deep belief in the principles of the First Amendment in part 
on my own experiences. 
I received my elementary education in a public school in a very small town in 
Nazi Germany. I was subjected to vehement anti-Semitic remarks, from my teacher, 
my classmates and others. "Judensau" (Jew pig) was far from the harshest. 
105. See A. Neier at 2.-3 (recounting his childhood as a Jew in Hitler's Ger-
many, his nauow escape from the Nazi death camps, and the extermina-
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tion of almost all his relatives, beyond his immediate family, during World 
War II). 
106. Gunther stated: 
My own experiences have certainly not led me to be insensitive to the myriad pains 
offensive speech can and often does impose. But the lesson I have drawn from my 
childhood in Nazi Germany and my happier adult life in this country is the need to 
walk the sometimes difficult path of denouncing the bigots' hateful ideas with all 
my power yet at the same time challenging any community's attempt to suppress 
hateful ideas by force of law. 
Gunther letter. 
107. Aryeh Neier, reflecting on his role in the Skokie incident, recalled: 
The most frequently repeated line of all in the many letters about Skokie that I 
received was: "How can you, a Jew, defend freedom for Nazis?" ... The response I 
made ... most often began with a question: "How can I, a Jew, refuse to defend 
freedom, even for Nazis? ... " Because we Jews are uniquely vulnerable, I believe 
we can win only brief respite from persecution in a society in which encounters are 
settled by power. As a Jew, therefore ... I want restraints placed on power ... I 
want restraints wnich pronibit those in power from interfering with my right to 
speak, my right to publish, or my right to gather with others who also feel tnreat-
ened .... To defend myself, I must restrain power with freedom, even if the tempo-
rary beneficiaries are the enemies of freedom. 
A. Neier at 4-5. 
108. Lawrence at 456. 
109. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
110. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
III. See Lawrence at 438-49. 
112.. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
113. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 3 ro (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397 (1989). 
114. One can imagine situations in which racially segregated schools would not 
convey the message of white supremacy, which Lawrence views as the 
central meaning of school segregation. See Lawrence at 441, 462.-64. Yet, 
under Brown, such schools surely would still violate the equal protection 
clause. For example, a black student who had been raised in a different 
culture marked by black supremacy, and then moved to the U.S. and 
attended a racially segregated school, might well interpret school segrega-
tion as conveying the message of white inferiority. Would Brown not 
demand that this student should nonetheless attend a desegregated school? 
As another example, a community might come to view racial diversity 
much the way it now regards religious diversity, so that the choice to 
attend a racially segregated school would be viewed as conveying no more 
stigmatizing a message than the choice to attend a religiously segregated 
school. Would Brown not insist, nevertheless, that no public schools could 
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be racially segregated, even if the option of attending them was completely 
voluntary? See Green v. County School Bd., 39r U.S. 430 (1968) (rejected 
"freedom-of-choice" plan for desegregation). 
115. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,471 (1973). 
116. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392. U.S. 2.36, 2.48 (1968). 
u7. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472. U.S. 38, 70 (1985). 
u8. 496 U.S. 2.26 (1990). 
119. Id. at 2.50 (emphasis added). 
12.0. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
12.1. Lawrence at 448. 
12.2.. 377 U.S. 2.18, 2.33 (1964). 
12.3. Equally unpersuasive is Lawrence's attempted reliance on cases upholding 
prohibitions upon race- or gender-designated advertisements for employ-
ees, home sales, and rentals (see Lawrence at 449 & n.81, 464 n.12.3). As 
the Supreme Court ruled, in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations 
Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973), such !ldvertisements constituted inte-
gral elements of the prohibited discriminatory conduct-e.g., refusing to 
hire women. Id. at 388-89. Therefore, these advertisements fit within the 
general category of speech that may be regulated on the ground that it 
constitutes an essential element of an unlawful act. 
12.4. Lawrence at 452. n.87. 
12.5. 337 U.S. I (1949). 
12.6. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
12.7. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,510 (1948). 
12.8. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4-5 (citations omitted). 
12.9. It is noteworthy that these two ringing endorsements of constitutional 
protection for offensive, provocative speech were written by justices at 
opposite ends of the Court's ideological spectrum. The agreement on this 
issue between Justice Douglas, a noted liberal, and Justice Harlan, a re-
spected conservative, indicates that their views represent a solidly en-
trenched consensus about free speech tenets. 
130. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 2.6 (emphasis added). 
131. Rutzick, "Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment 
Protection," 9 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1974). 
132.. Lawrence at 463 n.u9. 
133. Lawrence at 480. 
134. C. Lawrence, Presentation at ACLU Biennial Conference, Madison, Wis-
consin, June 16, 1989, at 30. 
135. A. Neier at 170-71. 
136. Lawrence at 480 n.166. 
137. The three affiliates that have challenged university hate speech rules are 
located in Connecticut, Michii::an, and Wisconsin. All three are engaged in 
ongoing efforts to counter race discrimination, of which I will describe a 
few examples. In a pathbreaking case under the Connecticut Constitution, 
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the Connecticut ACLU (along with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund) is 
challenging the de facto maintenance of two separate and unequal public 
school systems in the Hartford area: one for low-income, minority students 
in Hartford and one for more affluent, white students in Hartford's sub-
urbs. The Connecticut affiliate also successfully challenged racial discrimi-
nation in the hiring and promotion of minorities within the state police 
department, and has taken various initiatives to counter police brutality 
against minority citizens. The Michigan ACLU, along with the NAACP, is 
challenging the 1992 legislative reapportionment scheme for the Michigan 
House and Senate as unconstitutionally diluting minority votes. The Wis-
consin ACLU is co-counsel in a challenge to the practice of "red-lining" 
homeowners insurance in the Milwaukee area (to exclude coverage for 
areas with large minority populations), which resulted in the first appellate 
court ruling that this practice violates the current Federal Fair Housing 
Act. The Wisconsin affiliate also has fought against various discriminatory 
measures aimed at Chippewa Indians and Hmong immigrants. 
13 8. See Lasson, "Racism in Great Britain: Drawing the Line on Free Speech," 
7 B.C. Third World L.J. 161, 166, 171-73 (1987) (Democratic National 
Party chairman Kingsley Read was tried under Race Re.lations Act in 1978 
for referring in a public speech to "niggers, wogs, and coons," and for 
commenting on an Asian who had been killed in a race riot, "One down, 
a mi.Ilion to go." The judge instructed the jury that Read's words were not 
in themselves unlawful, and the jury acquitted Read). 
139. See, e.g., Raines, "London Police Faulted as Racial Attacks Soar," New 
York Times, Mar. 24, 1988, at A1, col. r. 
140. See Stein, "History against Free Speech: The New German Law against the 
'Auschwitz'-and Other-'Lies,'" 85 Mich. L. Rev. 277 (1986). Stein 
argues that although there was an article in the German Criminal Code in 
1871 that punished offenses against personal honor, "[T]he German Su-
preme Court ... consistently refused to apply this article to insults against 
Jews as a group-although it gave the benefit of its protection to such 
groups as 'Germans living in Prussian provinces, large landowners, all 
Christian clerics, German officers, and Prussian troops who fought in 
Belgium and Northern France.' " Id. at 286 (footnotes omitted). 
141. Sandra Coliver, "Hate Speech Laws: Do They Work?" in Striking a Bal-
ance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-Discrimination, 3 73-
74 (Sandra Coliver, ed., 1992); see also Kevin Boyle, "Overview of a 
Dilemma: Censorship Versus Racism," in Striking a Balance, 3 ("The 
South African laws against racial hatred were used systematically against 
the victims of its racist policies. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union laws against defamation and insult were vehicles for the persecution 
of critics who were often also victims of state-tolerated or sponsored 
anti-Semitism"). 
142. See Plaintiff's Exhibit Submitted in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
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Injunction at 1, Doe v. University of Mich., 7u F.Supp. 852- (E.D. Mich. 
1989) (No. 89-CV-71683-DT) (black student used term "white trash" in 
conversation with white student); id. at 5 (at beginning of preclinical 
dentistry course, recognized as difficult, faculty member led small group 
discussion, designed to "identify concerns of students"; dental student said 
that he had heard, from his minority roommate, that minorities have a 
difficult time in the course and were not treated fairly; the faculty member, 
who was black, complained that the student was accusing her of racism). 
143. These students wrote graffiti, including a swastika, on a classroom black-
board, and said they intended it as a practical joke. 
144. His allegedly offensive remark was the question why black people feel 
discriminated against; after being charged, he explained that he was at-
tempting to complain that black students in his dormitory tended to social-
ize together, with the result that he felt socially isolated. 
145. See Lawrence at 466 (noting "cruel irony" in Stanford's refusal to punish 
white students for hanging racist poster in a dormitory, while punishing 
black students who engaged in peaceful sit-in to protest that refusal). 
146. Id. at 450 n.82. 
147. Just one such problem is how "dominant majority groups" would be 
defined. Would they be defined in the context of the particular academic 
community-for example, at Howard Law School, blacks would probably 
fit this definition, and at Cardozo Law School, Jews would-or in the 
context of the larger society? 
148. For example, when the American Nazi party finally was allowed to march 
in Illinois in 1978, following the government's and Anti-Defamation 
League's attempts to prevent this demonstration, two thousand onlookers 
watched the twenty Nazis demonstrate. 
149. See S. Walker, at 59-62 (the ACLU's content-neutral defense of free 
speech for the Ku Klux Klan-which in the 1920s dominated many state 
legislatures, played a major role at the 1924 Democratic National Conven-
tion, and staged a massive march on Washington, D.C.-led to a decline 
in the Klan's influence by exposing its vicious plans to public view). See 
also Neier, at 34: "The Nazis deter the expression of anti-Semitism in 
forms that might be more palatable to the American public and, therefore, 
more threatening to the Jews. Other anti-Semites must impose restraints 
on themselves for fear of being bracketed with the almost universally hated 
Nazis. A strong Nazi movement would be a great danger to Jews in the 
United States; a weak Nazi movement with no potential for growth has 
its uses." 
150. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
151. Id. at 419. 
152. In response to a letter demeaning women that a student club had circu-
lated, Derek Bok, president of Harvard University, argued that this letter 
should not be suppressed. He then issued the following public criticism of 
the letter: 
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The wording of the letter was so extreme and derogatory to women that I wanted 
to communicate my disapproval publicly, if only to make sure that no one could 
gain the false impression that the Harvard administration harbored any sympathy 
or complacency toward the tone and substance of the letter. Such action does not 
infringe on free speech. Indeed, statements of disagreement are part and parcel of 
the open debate that freedom of speech is meant to encourage; the right to condemn 
a point of view is as protected as the right to express it. Of course, I recognize that 
even verbal disapproval by persons in positions of authority may have inhibiting 
effects on students. Nevertheless, this possibility is not sufficient to outweigh the 
need for officials to speak out on matters of significance to the community-
provided, of course, that they take no action to penalize the speech of others. 
Bok, "Reflections of Free Speech: An Open Letter to the Harvard Commu-
nity," Educ. Rec., Winter 1985, at 6. 
153. See, e.g., Neier at 170 (Illinois ACLU, which had represented neo-Nazi 
group seeking to demonstrate, also assisted anti-Nazi groups in securing 
their First Amendment rights to counter-demonstrate). 
154. Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy 
(Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1994), 126. 
155. Lawrence at 466. 
156. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
157. Neier at no. 
158. Lawrence at 466. 
159. Id. at 467. 
160. This paragraph and the following paragraph are drawn in large part from 
Gale and Strossen, "The Real ACLU," 2. Yale J.L. & Feminism 161, 174-
76 (1990). 
161. See H. Kalven, at 4. 
162. M. L. King, "Letter from Birmingham Jail," in Why We Can't Wait, 
76 (1964). 
163. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). 
164. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); 
Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. III (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 
550 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372. U.S. 229 (1963). 
165. See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (during political meeting 
in university chapel, appellant, a Black Panther, had referred to specific 
policemen as "mother-fucking fascist pig cops"; Supreme Court summarily 
vacated conviction under law which it found unconstitutionally over-
broad); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972) (where appellant, a 
black demonstrator, had made several threatening statements to police 
officers, including "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you," Court reversed 
conviction under law that it found unconstitutionally overbroad); see also 
Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (where police officer said to 
young suspect's mother, "Get your black ass in the goddamned car," and 
suspect's mother responded, "You god damn mother fucking police-I am 
going to [the Superintendent of Police] about this," lower courts upheld 
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mother's conviction on fighting words doctrine, but the Supreme Court re-
versed). 
166. Karst, "Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment," 43 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 2.0, 43-44 (1975). 
167. Murphy, "Opinion, The Supreme Court Flag-Burning Decision: The Sym-
bol versus the Reality," Higher Educ. & Nat'l Alf., Sept. 2.5, 1989, at 5. 
